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INTRODUCTION

The prolonged drought which brought water rationing, forest fires, and severe crop losses to many parts of the country
during the summer of 1977 focused public attention on longrange water resource problems in the United States. According
to U.S. News and World Report:
It is estimated that by the year 2000, only three of the 18
federally designated water regions on the U.S. mainland-New England, the Ohio basin and the South AtlanticEastern Gulf area-will be able to live comfortably with their
water supplies. And even there, purity may prove to be just
as serious a problem as shortages.'
An increased demand for water due to population growth,' ris* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of
Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
The preparation of this article has been supported by the Office of Water Resources Research and Technology, United States Department of the Interior, as authorized under the Water Resources Research Act of 1964.
The assistance of Mark Morgan is gratefully acknowledged along with that of the
University of Kentucky Water Resources Research Center.
Is U.S. Running Out of Water?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 18, 1977, at 33.
The population of the United States has grown from 76 million in 1900 to 204
million in 1970 and projections indicate that this trend is likely to continue. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrED STATES
5, table 2 (1970).
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ing per capita use of water,3 and the progressive concentration
of population in urban areas4 will be major causes of this impending water shortage.
Fortunately, the water supply is much better in Kentucky
than in most other areas of the United States. Kentucky's climate and topography insure that, with proper management,
water will generally be available. The average annual rainfall
ranges from thirty-six to forty-two inches in the northern counties, forty-two to forty-seven inches in the central portion of the
state, and forty-seven to fifty inches in the southern area. This
produces a forty-five-inch average annual rainfall.5 Although
there are seasonal variations, rainfall is generally adequate
throughout the year.'
Kentucky has 544 square miles of streams, rivers, lakes
and reservoirs.7 The flowing surface waters of the state comprise a network of rivers and streams ranging from the Ohio
River and its main tributaries to the small creeks which drain
into the Ohio's lesser tributary streams. The Ohio forms the
northern boundary of Kentucky for a distance of 664 miles and
drains a total area of 204,000 square miles from portions of fourteen states.8 About ninety-seven percent of Kentucky's 40,000
square mile area drains into the Ohio River, mainly through
seven major river basins: the Big Sandy, Licking, Kentucky,
Salt, Green, Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. The remaining
3 Because of industrialization, per capita use of water in the United States increased from 526 to 1893 gallons daily per person during the first six decades of this
century. J. WRIGHT, THE COMING WATER FAMINE 19 (1966). As industrial growth continues, per capita water use will also increase. Stein, Problems and Programsin Water
Pollution, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 388, 394 (1962).
1 Urbanization will put a severe strain on the nation's water resources since the
water-holding capacity of an area is reduced when rural lands are converted into highdensity residential areas. For example, paved surfaces retain heat, increase evaporation, and reduce recharge area for replenishment of ground water resources. F. Moss,
THE WATER CRIsIs 4-5 (1967); Maloney & Ausness, Administering State Water Resources: The Need for Long-Range Planning, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 209, 210 (1971).
1 R. KRIEGER, R. CUSHMAN & N. THOMAS, WATER IN KENTUCKY 10 (Ky. Geol. Sur-

vey, Spec. Pub. No. 16, 1969).
6 KENTUCKY WATER RESOURCES STUDY COMMISSION, STUDY REPORT TO THE GovERNOR AND 1960 LEGISLATURE 5 (1959).

WATER INFORMATION CENTER, INC., WATER ATLAS, plate 3 (1973).
'U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, KENTUCKY WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 15
(1975). Normal flows on the Ohio River are largely regulated by navigation structures
which provide a channel depth of nine feet. This system consists of nine modem locks
and dams and eight older structures. Id. at 17.
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area, located in extreme western Kentucky, drains directly into
the Mississippi River.9 There are no natural lakes of any size
in the state, but a number of large artificial lakes or reservoirs,
such as Lake Cumberland, Kentucky Lake and Lake Barkley,
have been created by river impoundment. In addition, impoundments on small tributary or headwater streams have created a number of small lakes and ponds for farm use, municipal
water supply or recreational purposes.' 0 Finally, there are many
large springs in the state, some flowing several hundred gallons
per minute."
Ground water is also plentiful in some parts of the state.
There are five major ground water provinces in Kentucky: the
Eastern Coal Field Region, the Blue Grass Region, the Mississippian Plateau Region, the Western Coal Field Region and the
Jackson Purchase Region.' 2 The Jackson Purchase Region and
the alluvial fill areas along the Ohio River are the richest
sources of ground water in Kentucky, but good to moderate
supplies are also available from the Mississippian Plateau and
3
Western Kentucky Coal Field regions.'
Although adequate supplies of water are generally available in Kentucky, the law governing its use and allocation is
much less satisfactory. At present, Kentucky water law is a
complex mixture of common law and statutory water rights.14
The purpose of this article is to evaluate these water rights and
suggest a number of improvements. Part I will examine the
common law rules as they relate to both surface water and
ground water. Part II will focus upon Kentucky's present system of statutory water use regulation and will identify some of

I

KENTUCKY WATER RESOURCES STUDY COMMISSION, STUDY REPORT TO THE GoVERNOR AND 1960 LEGISLATURE 62 (1959).
, Ky. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATURAL RESOURCES OF KENTUCKY 28 (1967).

Id. at 30.
2

The Knobs Region is a subdivision which is omitted from some classifications.

"KENTUCKY

WATER RESOURCES STUDY COMMISsION, STUDY REPORT TO THE GovER-

1960 LEGISLATURE 77-79 (1959).
" For additional information on Kentucky water law, see R. AuSNESS, LEGAL INSTI-

NOR AND

TUTIONS FOR THE ALLOCATION OF WATER AND THEIR IMPACT ON COAL CONVERSION OPERA-

TIONS IN KENTUCKY (Univ. of Ky. Water Resources Research Inst. Rept. No. 95, 1976);
R. AUSNESS & B. FLYNN, THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN KENTUCKY (Univ. of Ky.
Water Resources Research Inst. Rept. No. 86, 1975); D. TARLOCK, EVALUATION OF THE
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF DIVERSION, TRANSFER, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER IN
KENTUCKY (Univ. of Ky. Water Resources Research Inst. Rept. No. 15, 1968).
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its more serious deficiencies. Part III will recommend some
short-range legislative revisions. Constitutional issues will be

treated in Part IV and a few long-range alternatives will be
considered in Part V.
I., COMMON LAW WATER RIGrrs

A.

Surface Water
The right to consume surface water in the United States
is governed by two major allocation systems, riparianism and
prior appropriation. The riparian system is found in most of the
eastern states' 5 while the prior appropriation system prevails in
the West.",
1. The PriorAppropriationSystem
Priority and beneficial use are fundamental elements of
the prior appropriation system. The prior appropriation doctrine provides that the appropriator who is first in time is first
in right, and a prior or earlier appropriator is entitled to satisfy
his water needs before a subsequent appropriator may satisfy
his.'7 The subsequent or junior appropriator also possesses a
legally protected water right, but it is subordinate to that of the
senior appropriator.' 8
,"
Mississippi is the only eastern state which presently follows the prior appropriation system. Formerly a riparian state, Mississippi enacted its prior appropriation
statute in 1956. Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-7 (1972). See also Champion, PriorAppropriation in Mississippi:A Statutory Analysis, 39 Miss. L.J. 1 (1967).
" Consumptive riparian rights have no legal status in the eight western states
which adhere to the "Colorado doctrine." These states include Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. F. TRELEASE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 11 (2d ed. 1974). Riparian rights exist along with appropria-

tive water rights in the 11 "California doctrine" states. These include Alaska, California, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, and Washington. In these states, for the most part located along the Pacific
coast or in the Great Plains area, riparian rights were recognized before the prior
appropriation system was adopted. However, since the riparian and appropriative
systems are not very compatible, most "California doctrine" states limit the exercise
of riparian rights to some extent. Trelease, Coordinationof RiparianandAppropriative
Rights to the Use of Water, 33 nTx. L. REv. 24 (1954).
11City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949); Bailey v. Idaho
Irrigation Co., 227 P. 1055 (Idaho 1924). In addition, priority of appropriation governs
the respective rights of the various users regardless of whether the senior appropriator
diverts water at a point below where junior appropriators make their diversions from
the stream.
'" Smith v. O'Hara, 43 Cal. 371, 375 (1872). This protection of the junior appropri-
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Under prior appropriation, water rights are derived from
beneficial use of the water rather than from land ownership.Not only must the use be a beneficial one, but the methods of
diverting the water, conveying it to the place of use, and applying it to the land or machinery for which it is appropriated
must also be efficient under the circumstances. 0 Appropriations are for a definite quantity of water, 21 usually expressed in
cubic feet per second for direct diversion or in acre-feet for
reservoir storage. 22 Diversions are often limited to specific times
of the day or week.? Moreover, administrative procedures for
appropriating water invariably require the applicant to designate the proposed place of use for the water he desires to2 appropriate. 24 The place of use may be on nonriparian land. In the West, water rights are perpetual in duration, although they may be lost or abandoned through nonuse. 21 For
allocating water during times of shortage or for choosing between simultaneous applications, several states have enacted
statutes giving certain uses preferred status.27 Some states also
give these preferred uses condemnation powers.28 Nowadays,
appropriative rights usually operate within a comprehensive
ative right may be had against unlawful acts of senior appropriators as well as by
others.
1l 1A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 263
(1964).
0 Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in Water Law in the United
States, 2 NAT. REsouRcES J. 416, 417 (1962). Although the date of priority is generally
established by the date of public notice or by the date of application for a permit, the
appropriation is effectively secured merely by applying the water to the stated use.
Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INnus.
& COM. L. REv. 647, 688 (1968).
21 5 R. PoWEL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 735 (1973).
22 1 W. HUTCmNS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 491
(1971).
2 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-04 (1960); UTAI CODE ANN. § 73-3-2 (Supp.
1977).
2 1 W. HtrrcmNs, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NIMETEN WESTERN STATES 517
(1971).
' Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 647, 688 (1968).
2 Johnson, The Challenge of PrescriptiveWater Rights, 30 TEx. L. REv. 669, 673
(1952).
SAmZ. REv. STAT. § 45-147 (Supp. 1977-78); CAL.WATER CODE §§ 106, 1254, 1460
(West 1971); KAN. STAT. § 82a-707(b) (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 540.140 (1960); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.040 (1972); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3 (1959).
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
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statutory arid administrative framework. In most jurisdictions
permits are issued by a state administrative agency pursuant
to some form of adjudicatory process. The agency often has the
power to deny or modify permit applications in order to protect
2
senior appropriators or the public interest. 1
2.

The RiparianSystem

The riparian system appears to have originated in the
United States during the early part of the nineteenth century, 30
although some commentators claim that it developed from the
French civil law31 or the English common law.12 Under the con3
cept of riparianism, both consumptive and nonconsumptive
rights arise from ownership of land34 which borders on natural
21 Davis, Australianand American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 647, 688-89 (1968).
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827)(No. 14,312); J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES 353, 355 (1828).
3, Busby, American Water Rights Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Origins and Some
of Its Trends, With Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5
S.C.L.O. 106, 113-14 (1952); Weil, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33
HARV'. L. REv. 133 (1919); Weil, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of
Water Courses in the Common and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 342 (1918).
32 Maas & Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian
Doctrine?, 10 PUBLIC PoucY 109 (1960). See also Lauer, The Common Law Background
of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963); Murphy, English 'Water Law
Doctrine Before 1400, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 103 (1957).
3 Riparian landowners possess a right of access to adjacent navigable waters.
Board of Trustees v. Maderia Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. App.
1973); McCarthy v. Coos Head Timber Co., 302 P.2d 238, 246 (Ore. 1956); Hollan v.
State, 308 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). They also share with other members
of the public the right to navigate, fish, swim, or bathe in such waters. Harris v.
Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Ark. 1955); Harrison County v. Guice, 140 So. 2d 838,
842 (Miss. 1962). Riparian property is also subject to the doctrines of accretion, reliction, avulsion, and erosion. See generally 5A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 2560-65 (J. Grimes, ed. 1957); 56 Am. JuR. Waters
§§ 983-98 (1947); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters §§ 983-86 (1973).
11 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 843, comment e (1939); Jones v. Conn, 64 P. 855 (Ore.
1901). The term "riparian" is derived from "ripa," the Latin word for river bank. The
beds of navigable watercourses normally are not subject to private ownership, but are
held in trust by the state for the common use and benefit of its citizens. Maloney &
Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal
Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REv. 185 (1974); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970);
Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are
They in the PublicInterest?, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 285 (1972); Note, The Public Trust in
Public Waterways, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 219 (1974).
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watercourses such as lakes" or streams. 6 As a general rule,
37
however, riparian rights do not attach to artificial waterbodies
or to diffused surface waters. 3 Although commentators have
differed about the nature of riparian rights, 3 they generally
agree that no rights of ownership attach to the corpus of the
water as long as it remains in the stream "because. . .so long
as it continues to run there cannot be that possession of it
which is essential to ownership." 4 ' Instead, in most jurisdictions, a riparian owner has only a usufructuary right to the
water. 2 Moreover, riparian rights are not absolute, but correlative,4 3 and each landowner must consider the needs, of other
riparian proprietors.
a.

Consumptive Use Rules

There are two doctrines that govern consumptive rights to
water under the riparian system, the natural flow doctrine and
the reasonable use rule.
33Humphreys Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 297 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1927); 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 52.1(D) (R. Clark ed. 1967); Davis, Water Rights in Iowa, 41 IOWA L.
REv. 216, 229 (1956); Maloney & Plager, Florida'sLakes: Problems in a Water
Paradise, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 52-54 (1960). These rights are also known as "littoral"
rights where a natural lake or pond is involved. 56 AM. JuR. Waters § 282 (1947).
" A stream flows in a particular direction, possesses a definite channel, bed, banks
or sides, and discharges into some other body of water. Piper v. Hawley, 175 P. 417
(Cal. 1918); Yaskill v. Thibault, 173 N.E. 504 (Mass. 1930); McGill v. Card-Adams
Co., 47 N.W.2d 912 (Neb. 1951); Note, Acquisitionof the Right to Use Water, 29 TUL.
L. REv. 554, 555 (1955). Kentucky law is substantially in accord with this definition.
Winters v. Berea College, 349 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1961); Morgan v. Morgan, 266 S.W. 35
(Ky. 1924); Ky. REv. STAT. § 151.100(4) (1974)[hereinafter cited as KRS].
" 3 H. FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 827b, 838 (1904); but see Evans,
RiparianRights in Artificial Lakes and Streams, 16 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1951).
m Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge of Bounty?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 72, 108 (1968). KRS § 151.100(5) (1974) defines diffused surface water as
water which comes from falling rain or melting snow or ice, and which is diffused over
the surface of the ground, or which temporarily flows vagrantly upon or over the surface
of the ground as the natural elevations and depressions of the surface of the earth may
guide it, until such water reaches a stream or watercourse.
2 F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMNISTRATION-THE

FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 21.2 (1968).
* 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 137

(1971). See also Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist. v. Southwest Cotton
Co., 4 P.2d 369 (Ariz. 1931).
' Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 138 P. 997, 999 (Cal. 1914).
4 Harris v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 69 S.E. 623 (N.C. 1910); City of Syracuse v.
Stacy, 62 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1901); Carpenter v. Gold, 14 S.E. 329 (Va. 1892).
4 Lawrie v. Silsby, 56 A. 1106 (Vt. 1904).
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i. The Natural Flow Doctrine
Under the natural flow doctrine, each riparian proprietor
on a watercourse is entitled to have the stream flow through his
land in its natural condition, not perceptibly retarded, diminished or polluted by others.44 This doctrine assumes that the
law should follow nature and that each proprietor on a stream
should be entitled to have the stream continue flowing in its
natural state through his land.45
Consumptive uses are not entirely prohibited by the rule,
but a distinction is made between "natural" and "artificial"
wants or uses." Natural wants are those necessary to sustain
life and include water for bathing, drinking, household purposes, and watering animals.47 The natural flow doctrine allows
a riparian proprietor to use as much water as he needs for his
domestic or natural uses even if this depletes the entire streamflow.4
Artificial uses are those which increase man's comfort and
prosperity and include irrigation, manufacturing, power generation, mining operations, and large-scale stock watering.49 Riparian landowners may divert water for artificial uses as long
as there is no material interference with the natural flow of the
watercourse, but a nondomestic use which noticeably affects
the natural condition of the stream creates a cause of action for
a downstream owner even though he is not using the stream
and suffers no actual damages. 0 The plaintiff is deemed to be
injured by the change in the natural flow or condition of the
Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. Ray. 621, 628-29 (1968).
4 Kinyon, What Can a RiparianProprietorDo?, 21 MINN. L. Rv. 512, 527 (1937).
" Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492 (1842).
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W. 781 (Neb. 1903); Meng v. Coffey, 93 N.W.
713, 715-16 (Neb. 1903); Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083 (Ore. 1909); Salem Flouring Mills
Co. v. Lord, 69 P. 1033 (Ore. 1902); Martin v. Burr, 228 S.W. 543 (Tex. 1921).
11Spence v. McDonough, 42 N.W. 371 (Iowa 1889); Canton v. Shock, 63 N.E. 600
(Ohio 1902); Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903); Beuscher, Appropriation
Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrineStates, 10 BUFFALO L. Rav. 448, 452 (1961).
11Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N.Y. 341 (1878); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Miller, 3 A.
780 (Pa. 1886); Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 128 N.W. 596 (S.D. 1910);
Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 86 S.W. 733 (Tex. 1905); Nielson v. Sponer, 89 P. 155
(Wash. 1907).
0 Harvey Realty Co. v. Wallingford, 150 A. 60 (Conn. 1930); Robertson v. Arnold,
186 S.E. 806 (Ga. 1936); Roberts v. Martin, 77 S.E. 535 (W. Va. 1913); Comment,
Development of RiparianLaw in Alabama, 12 ALA. L. REv. 155, 158 (1959).
'
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stream and may obtain nominal damages or injunctive relief.5 '
In fact, under the natural flow doctrine, the downstream owner
is virtually forced to institute an action in order to protect his
rights against the acquisition of a prescriptive right by an
is reasonable and
upper riparian user even though the diversion
52
harmless under the existing circumstances.
In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, when many
mills and factories were powered by water, the natural flow
doctrine insured that the water passed down from one mill dam
to the next.53 Under modern conditions, however, the natural
flow doctrine has little utility. It prohibits many beneficial,
nonharmful uses simply because they materially diminish the
natural flow of the water. The natural flow doctrine also permits a riparian proprietor to play "dog in the manger"; that is,
he does not use the water himself and deprives the upstream
four or five states
owners of its use as well. Fortunately, only
54
still adhere to the natural flow doctrine.
ii.

The Reasonable Use Rule

The reasonable use rule is now the majority position, at
least in the eastern United States. The reasonable use rule and
the natural flow doctrine reflect widely divergent attitudes
about man's relation to a watercourse. 5 The natural flow doctrine emphasizes the status quo of nature, whereas the reasonable use rule seeks to promote the fullest beneficial use of
streams by adjacent riparian owners. Under the reasonable
use rule, each riparian proprietor may use the water for any
2, Guynn v. Wabash Water & Light Co., 104 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1914); Note, Water
Rights in Indiana, 32 IND. L.J. 39, 42 (1956).
Water and Water Courses-RiparianRights-Diversion of Storm or
1Teass,
'
Flood Waters for Use on Non-RiparianLands, 18 VA. L. REv. 223, 236 (1932).
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A, Scope Note, (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
31 Only Georgia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia expressly adhere
to the natural flow doctrine. Robertson v. Arnold, 186 S.E. 806 (Ga. 1936); McCord v.
Big Brothers Movement, Inc., 185 A. 480 (N.J. 1936); Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton
Water Supply Co., 124 A. 747 (Pa. 1924); McCausland v. Jarrell, 68 S.E.2d 729 (W.
Va. 1951).
In spite of this, the natural flow and reasonable use rules often tend to become
blended or confused in practice. Davis, Water Rights in Iowa, 41 IowA L. REv. 216, 218
n.8 (1956).
" 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 713 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRs § 853, comments c, d, & e (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
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beneficial purpose, provided that the intended use is reasonable with respect to the needs of other proprietors on the
stream and does not unreasonably interfere with their legitimate water uses. Of course, the mere fact of benefit to the
user does not establish the reasonableness of the use. 7 Moreover, neither the priority of use nor the extent of riparian
frontage or riparian land are generally considered in determining reasonableness . 8 Although riparian rights are regarded
as equal or correlative, each riparian user is not necessarily entitled to a proportionate share of the available water. 9 Indeed,
where the water supply cannot satisfy the needs of all riparian
users, some uses, otherwise beneficial, may be deemed unreasonable under the circumstances and prohibited."
The determination of the reasonableness of a use is a question of fact and must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Various factors may be considered, including rainfall, climate, season of the year, customs and usages, size, velocity and capacity
of the watercourse, nature and extent of improvements on the
watercourse, amount of water taken, place and method of diversion, place of use, previous uses, the object of the use, the
extent and type of use, its necessity and importance to society,
and the uses, rights and reasonable needs of other riparians.6 '
The reasonableness of a particular use may also be affected by
its location on the stream. The riparian proprietor at its mouth
may capture all he can, while the uppermost riparian must
62
consider the needs of downstream users.
The reasonable use rule, like the natural flow doctrine,
distinguishes between natural and artificial uses, and gives
preferential treatment to the former." Thus, a natural or domestic use will always be treated as reasonable, while compet5,Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface
Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 16 (1957).
1 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954); but see Trelease,
Alternatives to AppropriationLaw, 6 DENVER J. OF INT'L L. & POL. 283, 297 (1976).
5, Haar & Gordon, Riparian Water Rights vs. a PriorAppropriation System: A
Comparison, 38 B.U.L. REv. 207, 240 (1958).
10RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 47, 55.
62RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
63 Comment, Acquisition of the Right to Use Water, 29 TuL. L. REv. 554, 556
(1955).

1977]

WATER USE PERMITS

ing artificial uses may be enjoined,64 but no other preferences
are recognized under the reasonable use rule between types or
classes of use.
Finally, the reasonableness of a particular use must be
determined by present conditions and not by speculation concerning future circumstances."5 Hence, in the absence of activity by other riparians, a single riparian owner may use all of
the water in a stream.66 However, he does not thereby gain any
continuing right to the full flow of the stream since upstream
owners may commence reasonable uses in the future. 7 Thus, a
use which is reasonable under existing circumstances may later
become unreasonable when others initiate new uses on the
watercourse. 8
b.

Place-of-Use Restrictions

Under both the natural flow and reasonable use theories,
water rights are based on ownership of riparian land, a principle which prevents nonriparian landowners from using watercourses and which has led to other use restrictions as well.
i. Definitions of RiparianLand
Since surface water may be used only on "riparian" land, "
the courts have developed several tests to determine whether
a particular tract is riparian or not. Perhaps the most restrictive is the "source of title" test, under which riparian rights are
limited to the smallest parcel held under one title in a chain
of title leading to the present owner. 0 The size of a riparian
tract cannot be increased by the purchase of contiguous nonri11Although many courts have abandoned the old classifications of natural and
artificial use, all have recognized the existence of a preference for domestic uses.
'5 Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1944).
" Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 560 (Cal. 1938).
,5Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 47, 60.
'5 Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo. L. REV.1, 10 (1970). Both the reasonable use rule and the natural flow doctrine also govern private rights and duties among
riparian owners with respect to water quality. F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN,
WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION-THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 112.1 (1968).
'5 Farnham, The Permissible Extent of RiparianLand, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV.
31 (1972).
11Rancho S ita Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533 (Cal. 1935); L. KINNEY, THE LAW
OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 789 (2d ed. 1912).
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parian land, 7' and if the back portion of a riparian tract is sold
it loses its riparian character. 72 Moreover, the subsequent reuniting of a severed tract with the abutting tract will not reestablish its riparian status. 73 Thus, a riparian tract can be
decreased but never increased in those jurisdictions which follow the source of title rule. 74 This rule, which originated in
California, tends to restrict available surface water supplies to
a small group of riparian owners and has been largely confined
to the western states. 75 The rule supports the western policy of
limiting riparian rights as much as possible in order to provide
more water for appropriators, but it seems inappropriate for
eastern states where more water is available.
The more inclusive "unity of title" rule provides that any
tracts contiguous to the abutting tract are riparian, if held in
common ownership, regardless of when they were acquired.7 6
This approach permits an increase in the size of a riparian
parcel by the purchase of contiguous land even though the
added land had been nonriparian ever since its transfer from
governmental to private ownership. Given the trend toward
larger farms and landholdings in this country, application of
the unity of title theory will result in a continually expanding
quantity of riparian land. This rule has support in both eastern
77
and western jurisdictions.
The unity of title rule appears to be a better approach for
an eastern jurisdiction than the source of title test. Often a
riparian owner can use water on land added to his riparian
tract land without unreasonably curtailing the amount of water
available for other riparian owners. However, the failure of the

1,
Title Ins.

& Trust Co. v. Miller & Lux, 190 P. 433 (Cal. 1920); 5 R. POWELL,

THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 714 (1976).
72 Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978 (Cal. 1907).
" Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 86 S.W. 733 (Tex. 1905); Yearsley v. Cater, 270
P. 804 (Wash. 1928).
71Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a RiparianJurisdiction, 1969 Wis. L. REV.
864, 872.
Is Boehmer v. Big Rock Irrigation Dist., 48 P. 908 (Cal. 1897); Yearsley v. Cater,
270 P. 804 (Wash. 1928).
11 Levi & Schneeberger, The Chain and Unit of Title Theories for Delineating
RiparianLands: Economic Analysis as an Alternative to Case Precedent,21 BuFFALo
L. REv. 439, 442 (1972).
" Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571 (Kan. 1905); Jones v. Conn, 64 P. 855 (Ore. 1901);
Slack v. Marsh, 11 Phila. 543 (C.P. Pa. 1875); RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 843, comment
c (1939).
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unity of title rule to impose any restriction on the amount of
added land which can become riparian when acquired by one
riparian owner may adversely affect other riparian proprietors.
Accordingly, some courts have declared that the amount of
riparian land claimed under the unity of title rule must be
reasonable."8 Under this corollary, the distance of the land from
the watercourse is taken into account in deciding the reasonableness of the particular water use." Arguably, this affords
other riparians some protection against monopolization of
water by one riparian owner.
ii.

The Watershed Limitation

The concept of riparian land is further restricted in some
states by the watershed limitation, which provides that any
part of a tract of land which lies outside the watershed of a
body of water is not riparian to it even though the tract itself
borders on a natural watercourse and is otherwise riparian.'
This watershed limitation is followed in five western states8'
and a few eastern states."
The watershed limitation is based on the assumption that
,' Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 41 A. 385 (N.J. 1898), rev'd on other

grounds, 45 A. 596 (N.J. 1900). See also 1 KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER
RIGHTS 798 (2d ed. 1912); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954).
. 1, Farnham, Permissible Extent of RiparianLand, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 31,
57 (1972).
0 Johnson & Knippa, TransbasinDiversion of Water, 43 TEx. L. REv. 1035, 1036
(1965); Recent Important Decisions, Waters and Watercourses-Riparian
Land-Watershed, 20 MICH. L. Rv. 123 (1921). According to Professor Waite, the
source of title test and one version of the unity of title tests are not concerned with
the watershed limitation. The other version adds to the unity of title test the requirement that the land lie within the watershed of the watercourse to which it is riparian.
Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a RiparianJurisdiction,1969 WIs. L. REv. 864, 873.
See also Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 245 N.W. 390 (S.D. 1932). Professor Clark declares
this to be the general rule. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 53.5(c) (R. Clark ed. 1967).
On the other hand, Professor Casner contends that the unity of title definition without

the watershed limitation is the general rule. 6A

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 28.55

(A.J. Casner ed. 1954).
9' Hudson v. West, 306 P.2d 807 (Cal. 1957); Clark v. Allaman, 80 P. 571 (Kan.
1905); Sayles v. City of Mitchell, 245 N.W. 390 (S.D. 1932); Watkins Land Co. v.
Clements, 86 S.W. 733 (Tex. 1905); Miller v. Baker, 122 P. 604, 605 (Wash. 1912).
4 Harrell v. City of Conway, 271 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Ark. 1954); Sturtevant v. Ford,
182 N.E. 560 (Mass. 1932); Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 103 N.E. 87
(Mass. 1913); McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 65 A. 489, 494-95 (N.J. 1906);
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 130 S.E. 408 (Va. 1925); Town of Gordsonville v.
Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 511 (Va. 1921); Comment, 34 N.C. L. REv. 247, 247-48 (1956).
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land beyond the watershed is outside the boundaries established by nature for riparian ownership 3 and that water used
on land within the watershed will eventually return to the parent body of water.84 If water is withdrawn from one watershed
and drained into another, downstream owners along the first
watercourse would be damaged by diminution of the stream's
flow, while those along the second watercourse might be injured by the effects of an excessive stream flow.85 Thus, the
watershed limitation allows a riparian owner to use water on
his land to the maximum extent while at the same time protecting downstream owners, and protects riparians who are not
currently exercising their riparian rights by insuring that water
will be available if needed in the future.
Nevertheless, many commentators favor relaxation or abolition of the watershed rule.8 1 In the East, this restriction often
87
unduly limits water use and encourages waste of the resource.
At present, four eastern states have expressly adopted the
watershed rule,8 two have rejected it,8 and the majority has
not yet taken a position.
iii.

Effect of NonriparianUses

A nonriparian use is one in which water is diverted onto
nonriparian land. Land which lies outside of a stream's watershed is also deemed nonriparian in those states which adhere
to the watershed rule. Thus, diversions by nonriparian landowners and use of water by riparian owners on nonriparian
land are considered nonriparian uses. 0
13 2 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1571 (1904).

N1Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978 (Cal. 1907); Note, Limitation on
Diversionsfrom the Watershed: RiparianRoadblock to Beneficial Use, 23 S.C. L. REV.
43 (1971). Most industrial and municipal uses return up to 90% of the water diverted;
some water used for irrigation is also returned. Johnson & Knippa, TransbasinDiversion of Water, 43 TEx. L. REv. 1035, 1057 (1965).
I" Murphy, A Short Course on Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961
WASH. U. L.Q. 93, 94-95.
" Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 11 (1959);
O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionality of Regulating Existing
Uses of Water, 47 IOWA L. REv. 549, 557 (1962); Note, The Riparian Rights Doctrine
in South Carolina, 21 S.C. L. REv. 757, 769 (1969).
K7Marquis, Freeman & Heath, The Movement for New Water Rights Laws in the
Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REV. 797, 832 (1955).
" Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia; see note 82, supra.
Gillis v. Chase, 31 A. 18 (N.H. 1891); Lawrie v. Sillsby, 74 A. 94 (Vt. 1909).
Municipalities are usually not considered to be riparian owners. In theory, a
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Nonriparian uses, however, are not always prohibited.
According to one view, such uses are wrongful per se and riparian owners may obtain appropriate judicial relief even
though they have suffered no actual damages.' In states which
follow the reasonable use rule, however, a plaintiff must
usually prove actual damage before he can enjoin a nonriparian
use.9 2 A few states permit nonriparian uses even though downstream riparian owners are harmed.93 Nonriparian use is simply
one factor that is considered in determining whether the use is
reasonable in accordance with the requirements of the reasonable use rule. 4
c.

PrescriptiveRights

Most riparian jurisdictions allow both riparian and nonriparian owners to acquire prescriptive rights to particular water
uses. 5 In order to ripen into a prescriptive right, the use must
municipality cannot divert water for purposes of public water supply even where it
owns riparian property. Pernell v. City of Henderson, 16 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. 1941);
Webster v. Harris 69 S.W. 782 (Tenn. 1902); Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 19 S.E.2d
700 (Va. 1942); Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by
Municipalities, 57 MICH. L. REV. 349, 357 (1959). Actually, courts often allow
municipally-owned water utilities to withdraw water from a nearby watercourse and
deny relief to riparian owners on the basis of estoppel, laches, prescription, or a failure
on the part of the riparian owner to show damages. Buescher, Appropriation Water
Law Elements in RiparianDoctrine States, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 448, 455 (1961). A few
states have expressly recognized riparian rights for municipalities. Minneapolis Mill
Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs. of St. Paul, 58 N.W. 33 (Minn. 1894); City of Canton
v. Shock, 63 N.E. 600 (Ohio 1902); Grogan v. Brownwood, 214 S.W. 532 (Tex. 1919);
Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of Surface Streams,
12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 4 (1957). Of course municipalities usually acquire water rights by
eminent domain, and once water rights are obtained in this fashion, the municipality
may sell water to nonriparian users. Davis, Australian and American WaterAllocation
Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 647, 684 (1968).
9 Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction,1969 Wis. L. REV.
864, 875.
92 Metropolitan Util. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 140 N.W.2d 626 (Neb. 1966);
Jones v. Conn, 64 P. 855 (Ore. 1901); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273 (Tex. 1927).
13Poire v. Serra, 106 A.2d 39 (N.H. 1954); Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172
P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1946); Lawrie v. Sillsby, 74 A. 94 (Vt. 1909); Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law Within the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 377, 413 (1968).
" Note, Property Rights-RiparianRights, 34 N.C. L. REv. 247, 251 (1956).
Sibbett v. Babcock, 269 P.2d 42 (Cal. App. 1954); S.O. & C. Co. v. Ansonia
Water Co., 78 A. 432 (Conn. 1910); Manier v. Myers & Johns, 43 Ky. 514 (1844);
Harmon v. Carter, 59 S.W. 656 (Tenn. 1900); Martin v. Burr, 228 S.W. 543 (Tex. 1921);
Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508 (Va. 1921); Kirk v. Hoge, 97 S.E. 116 (Va.
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be adverse, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, and the
use must be made under a claim of right or title. 6 To establish
a right by prescription, the use must be maintained in a manner hostile to the right of the riparian proprietor against whom
it is claimed.97 The use must be visible and open so that the
riparian owner either knows, or should know that his rights
have been invaded. 8 It must also be continuous and uninterrupted for the entire prescriptive period. 9 Since some water
uses, like irrigation, may be sporadic rather than continuous,
this requirement is probably satisfied if the claimant uses the
water as his necessities require. Of course, the initiation of a
suit ends the adverse character of the use as does any other
substantial interruption during the prescriptive period.'," Likewise, the adverse use is interrupted if at any time during the
limitation period the adverse claimant concedes or acknowledges title in the true owner."0 ' Finally, use by one claiming a
prescriptive right must be under a claim of right in order
to
12
imply an ouster of the owner's exclusive right of control.
Because of the transient nature of water, prescriptive
water rights are difficult to acquire. In those states which follow
the natural flow doctrine, there must be an actionable invasion
of the right to the stream's natural flow,"0 3 while reasonable use
jurisdictions require an actionable wrong involving actual dam1918); Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a RiparianJurisdiction, 1969 Wis. L. REv.
864, 875.
" Prescription, like adverse possession, rests on the theory that aggrieved parties

should seek judicial relief within a reasonable time or be forever barred from a remedy.
Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 47, 48-49.
11Shellow v. Hagen, 101 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1960). An act is hostile when it is
inconsistent with the true owner's rights of ownership. Thus, a licensed or permissive
use can never give rise to a prescriptive right because such uses are not hostile to the
titleholder. Stewart v. White, 30 So. 526 (Ala. 1901); Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex.
1926); Rhoades v. Barnes, 102 P. 884 (Wash. 1909).
" Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 151 N.W. 258 (Wis. 1915).
" At common law there was no fixed period of prescription but by analogy the
courts followed the statute of limitations for adverse possession. 2 AMEmCAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.52 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954). The common law period is 20 years, but in
most states the prescriptive period is determined by statute. Id.
"1 Alta Land & Water Co. v. Hancock, 24 P. 645 (Cal. 1890); Harmon v. Carter,
59 S.W. 656 (Tenn. 1900).
,0, Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 47, 65.
,02Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 85 N.W. 402, 408 (Wis. 1901).
" 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW bF REAL PROPERTY
720 (rev. ed. 1976).
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ages to the servient owner.' 4 The scope of a prescriptive right,
once acquired, is measured by the use originally made and
actually enjoyed during the prescriptive period,'05 but the water
use may be changed at any time as long as the new use does
not increase the burden imposed on the servient estate.0 0 Finally, prescriptive rights, once acquired, may be lost by abandonment, although mere nonuse is only evidence of an intent
to abandon and is not conclusive.' 7
B.

Ground Water

Subsurface waters are classified as either underground
streams or percolating waters, and different consumptive use
rules apply to each. 08 Underground or subsurface streams flow
in well-defined channels below the earth's surface, generally
have ascertainable banks and courses,' 0' and are subject to the
same consumptive use rules that govern surface watercourses." ' However, underground streams are relatively unusual and a party alleging the existence of one generally has the
burden of proof on that issue."' Furthermore, the existence and
location of the underground stream must be reasonably ascer'2
tainable from the surface without excavation."
Anaheim Water Co. v. Semi-Tropic Water Co., 30 P. 623 (Cal. 1883); Preston
v. Clark, 214 N.W. 226 (Mich. 1927); Schulenberg v. Zimmerman, 90 N.W.156 (Minn.
1902); Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L.REV. 621, 630 (1968).
' Smith v. McElderry, 124 So. 896 (Ala. 1929); Tinker v. Bessel, 99 N.E. 946
(Mass. 1912).
1" 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 337 (1947); 93 C.J.S. Waters § 185 (1956). Accord, Burkman v. City of New Lisbon, 19 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1945).
,07
Burkman v. City of New Lisbon, 19 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1945).
," 93 C.J.S. Waters § 86 (1956).
S
Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304, 307 (Neb. 1933); Canada v. City of
Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694 (Okla. 1937); 2 S.WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
§ 1077 (3d ed. 1911).
"I Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904); Evans v.
City of Seattle, 47 P.2d 984 (Wash. 1935); Note, Water Law-Ground Water Rights
in Missouri-A Need for Clarification,37 Mo. L. REv. 357, 358 (1972); Comment, The
Law of Underground Water: A Half-Century of Huber v. Merkel, 1953 Wis. L. REv.
491, 499.
"I Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1951); Ryan v. Quinlan, 124
P. 512, 516 (Mont. 1912).
2I Hayes v. Adams, 218 P. 933, 935 (Ore. 1923); Collins v. Charters Valley Gas
Co., 18 A. 1012 (Pa. 1890); Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., 54 P. 244
(Utah 1898). Contra, Maricopa County Mun. Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest
Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 377 (Ariz. 1931), modified in other respects 7 P.2d 254 (Ariz.
1932).
"I
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Percolating waters "ooze, seep or filter through the soil
beneath the stzface, without a defined channel. 11 3 Ground
water is presumed to be percolating rather than flowing in an
underground stream because visible surface indications and
available scientific information are usually inadequate to allow
an accurate determination of the source and movement of underground water. Some states have even abandoned the underground stream classification, and hold all ground waters to be
percolating."'
Although consumptive use rules with respect to percolating ground water are hopelessly fragmented and confused,
three major approaches can be discerned in the East: the absolute ownership doctrine, the American rule and the correlative
rights doctrine. In addition, many western states now apply the
115
prior appropriation system to ground water.
" Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 139 S.E. 308, 311 (Va. 1927).
Hinton v. Little, 296 P. 582, 583 (Idaho 1931); KAN. STAT. §§ 82a-702 to 703
(1969); OR.REV. STAT. § 537.515(3) (1973); N.D. CENT.CODE § 61-01-01 (1960).
"' In the West, underground streams have always been subject to appropriation
in the same manner as surface waters. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation
Dist. v. Southwest Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369 (Ariz. 1931); Chandler v. Utah Copper Co.,
135 P. 106 (Utah 1913). Increasingly, these states have moved toward public control
and management in the distribution of their percolating ground water as well. Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington and
Wyoming now have separate ground water codes based on the prior appropriation
model. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to 141 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 42-226 to 239
(Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 89-2911 to 2936 (Supp. 1975); NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 534.01C-.180 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-11-1 to 40 (1968); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 82, §§ 1002-1014 (West 1970); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.05-.990 (1973); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 90.010-.44.250 (1972); Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-121 to 147 (1957).
Five other states (Alaska, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah) have
made their general appropriation statutes applicable to percolating ground water.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.030, .040(a), .260(5) (1971); KAN. STAT. § 82a-707 (1969),
construed in Cities of Hesston & Sedgwick v. Smrha, 391 P.2d 93 (Kan. 1964) and
Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01
(1960); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-3 (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1
(1953), construed in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 368 P.2d 461 (Utah 1962).
The remaining western states follow one of the common law rules and do not apply
prior appropriation principles to ground water. California follows the correlative rights
doctrine; Arizona and Nebraska follow the American rule. See Bristor v. Cheatham,
255 P.2d 173 (Ariz. 1953); In re Metropolitan Util. Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d 626
(Neb. 1966) and Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304 (Neb. 1933).
Texas continues to adhere to the absolute ownership doctrine. City of Corpus
Christi v. Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955); Pecos County Water Control &
Improv. Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Houston & Tex.
Central R.R. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904); Greenhill & Gee, Ownership of Ground
Water in Texas: The East Case Reconsidered, 33 T~x. L. REv. 620 (1955).
'"
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1.

The Absolute Ownership Doctrine

According to the English or absolute ownership doctrine,
a landowner may extract an unlimited quantity of percolating
ground water from his land and use it on overlying or distant
lands, regardless of injury to adjacent landowners."' The rule
imposes liability only for waste or for malicious injury to an17
other."
The absolute ownership doctrine originated in Acton v.
Blundell,"' an English case decided in 1843. The plaintiff in
that case was a manufacturer whose well was affected by
nearby mining operations. As the defendant pumped water out
of the shaft of his coal mine, he drew the percolating water from
under the plaintiffs well. The plaintiff sought damages in an
action on the case. Although the defendant's conduct might
have been actionable if a surface watercourse had been involved, the court refused to apply the law of surface waters
because
no man can tell what changes these underground sources
have undergone in the progress of time ....
[T]here can be
no ground for implying any mutual consent or agreement for
ages past ... which is one of the foundations on which the
law as to running streams is supposed to be built .... "I
Instead, the Acton court held that the defendant was entitled
to use the water as he saw fit, even if he injured the plaintiff.
This result was justified since the defendant, as owner of the
overlying land, had an exclusive right to any percolating
ground water beneath his tract.
The absolute ownership doctrine recognizes a vested property in the overlying landowner to percolating ground water
"I Stoner v. Patten, 63 S.E. 897 (Ga. 1909); Edwards v. Haeger, 54 N.E. 176 (Ill.
1899).
"I Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533 (1850); St. Amand v. Lehman, 47 S.E. 949 (Ga.
1904); Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904); Greenleaf
v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); Rose
v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934).
" 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Exch. Ch. 1843). See also Chasemore v. Richards, 2 H. &
H. 168 (1857), affl'd, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859).
"1 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233-34 (Exch. Ch. 1843). This same sense of inadequate
knowledge was expressed in other cases. Ewart v. Graham, 11 Eng. Rep. 132 (1859);
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855). See also Comment, Wisconsin Ground Water
Law-A New Era, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 309, 324.
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beneath his property regardless of whether he actually puts the
water to use. It has been said that "the percolating water belongs to the owner of the land, as much as the land itself, or
the rocks and stones in it."' 2 However, since a landowner has
no rights against an adjoining landowner who also withdraws
ground water, it is somewhat misleading to say that he owns
"absolutely" the percolating water under his land.' 2 ' Instead it
would seem that the landowner does not really own the water
until he has reduced it to actual possession. 2 ' The property
right involved is the landowner's exclusive right of access to the
ground water through his land, rather than ownership of the
underground water itself.'2
The absolute ownership rule was followed in many American jurisdictions in the nineteenth century,' and is still recognized in a number of states today.' It is.often criticized, however, because it fails to account for the nature of ground water
and because it favors municipalities and other large users who
2
are able to drill deep wells.'
2 Fire Dist. No. 1 v. Graniteville Spring Water Co., 152 A. 42, 43 (Vt. 1930),
quoting Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261, 265 (1908). See also Davis v. Spaulding, 32 N.E. 650, 651 (Mass. 1892), where the court stated:
[W]ater percolating underground. . . is in law a part of the land itself,
in the same sense that earth, gravel, stones, or minerals of any kind are
constituent parts of the land, and is the absolute property of the owner in
the same way, and to the same extent, that the other constituent parts of
his land are his absolute property; so that he has the same right to . . .use
it, on the land or elsewhere, that he has to . . .use or sell sand, soil, clay,
ores, or any other constituent part of the land.
121 Maloney & Plager, Florida's Ground Water: Legal Problems in Managing a
Precious Resource, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 751, 767-68 (1967).
22 Note, Percolating Water Law-Theories of Ownership and Problemsof Distribution in the Western United States, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1419, 1422 (1955).
in Kirkwood, Appropriationof Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REv. 1, 19 (1948).
12 Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532 (1850); Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga. 45 (1879); Kinnard v. Standard Oil Co., 12 S.W. 937 (Ky. 1890); Wilson v. City of New Bedford, 108
Mass. 261 (1871); Chase v. Silvertstone, 62 Mo. 175 (1873); Haldeman v. Bruckhart,
45 Pa. 514 (1863). The rule seems to have arisen independently in Massachusetts. See,
e.g., Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836).
'" See, e.g., Edwards v. Haeger, 54 N.E. 176 (Ill. 1899); Logan Gas Co. v. Glasgo,
170 N.E. 874 (Ohio 1930); White River Chair Co. v. Connecticut River Power Co., 162
A. 859 (Vt. 1932). Professor Powell estimates that about one quarter of the states still
adhere to the absolute ownership doctrine. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
725 (1973).
I2 McHendrie, The Law of Underground Water, 13 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 1, 5
(1940).
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2.

The American Rule

The American or reasonable use rule127 allows a landowner
to use as much percolating ground water as he needs, regardless
of any adverse effect on other landowners, as long as the water
use is reasonably related to the natural use of his overlying
land. 21 The use must be beneficial; a malicious or wasteful use
is considered unreasonable per se 1 9 and may be enjoined even
though the plaintiff has suffered no actual damage.' 3 As a
general rule, however, the use of water on overlying land for
agricultural, domestic, mining or manufacturing purposes is
131
deemed to be reasonable.
The absolute ownership doctrine and the American rule
are virtually the same with respect to the landowner's right to
use percolating ground water on overlying land, but they differ
significantly in regard to the extraction and transportation of
ground water for use in distant areas. The absolute ownership
doctrine permits ground water to be transported and used on
non-overlying land without liability even though neighboring
landowners are injured. According to the American rule, however, the sale or use of water on distant lands is unreasonable
and actionable if it impairs the ground water supply of another
landowner, even though the defendant's use is beneficial.3 2
I" Although the American rule is often called the reasonable use rule, it should
not be confused with the surface water reasonable use rule.
'1"Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, Groundwater:From Windmills to Comprehensive Public Management, 52 Nm. L. REv. 179, 205 (1973).
2I Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080 (Iowa 1903); Stillwater Water Co. v.
Farmer, 93 N.W. 907 (Minn. 1903).
"1 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
726 (1973); Hanks & Hanks, The
Law in New Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RUTGERs L. REv. 621 (1970).
"' Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 31 So. 905 (Miss. 1902);
Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 140 S.E. 57 (W. Va. 1927); Pence v. Carney, 52
S.E. 702 (W. Va. 1905); Lugar, Water Law in West Virginia, 66 W. VA. L. Rv. 191,
214 (1964). It cannot be said with certainty that the courts would find any use reasonable if it actually resulted in a substantial injury to a neighboring landowner's ground
water supply. In nearly all the cases applying the reasonable use rule, the percolating
water was extracted for sale or use at distant points. No case was found in which both
parties were using the water on overlying land for a beneficial purpose and the court
applied the percolating water reasonable use rule in such a way that one party was
allowed to use the water to the complete deprivation of another's supply. Maloney &
Plager, Florida'sGround Water: Legal Problems in Managinga PreciousResource, 21
U. MIAMI L. REv. 751, 770 (1967).

"I Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109 (Mich. 1917); Erickson v. Crookston
Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 111 N.W. 391 (Minn. 1907); Rouse v. City of Kinston,
123 S.E. 482 (N.C. 1924); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 697 (Okla. 1937).
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The leading case on the American rule is Forbell v. City
of New York. 133 The plaintiff in Forbell used ground water for
farming operations on his land. The City of New York, which
owned an adjoining two-acre tract, sank a number of wells to
obtain water for sale to the City of Brooklyn. When the wells
interfered with plaintiff's farming operations, he sought injunctive relief. Although the court conceded that there would
be no liability under the absolute ownership doctrine, it nevertheless enjoined the defendant's extraction of ground water for
transportation and sale to distant users.
The American rule has displaced the older absolute ownership doctrine in many jurisdictions, and is now probably the
majority position.'34 Although the American rule differs from
the absolute ownership doctrine where the use of ground water
on non-overlying land is concerned, the two rules are quite
similar conceptually and the American rule may be regarded
as a modification of the absolute ownership doctrine.' 35 Both
rules place the ownership of percolating waters in overlying
landowners, but the American rule places reasonable limitations upon the exercise of ownership rights similar to those in
the law of private nuisance. Also, like the absolute ownership
doctrine, the American rule favors large users at the expense
of farmers and domestic users who often have shallow wells and
3
less powerful pumps.'
3.

The Correlative Rights Doctrine

Under the correlative rights doctrine, each landowner over
a common ground water pool has an equal and correlative right
to make a beneficial use of the water on his overlying land. The
' 58 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1900).
,3 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 165 So. 764 (Ala. 1936); Gagnon v.
French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904); Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W.
1080 (Iowa 1903); Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109 (Mich. 1917); Bayer v.
Nello L. Teer Co., 124 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 1962); Basset v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H.
249 (1862); Stevens v. Spring Valley Water Works & Supply Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 503
(1964); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 14 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1940); Drummond v.
White Oak Fuel Co., 140 S.E. 57 (W. Va. 1927). Professor Powell estimates that about
half of the states currently follow the American rule. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 726 (1973).
m 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

634 (1974).

, Note, PercolatingWater Law-Theories of Ownership and Problems of Distribution in the Western United States, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1419, 1423 (1955).
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correlative rights doctrine is sometimes known as the
"California rule" because it was introduced by the California
Supreme Court in Katz v. Walkinshaw.' 37 The plaintiff in the
Katz case was using ground water for domestic and irrigation
purposes on land overlying an artesian basin. He brought suit
when the defendant began pumping the water for sale and use
outside the basin. The court stated that use of ground water on
non-overlying land would not be allowed if it caused injury
to an overlying user, but went on to declare that landowners
above a common underground basin have equal rights in the
underlying water so it must be prorated among them when the
13 8
available supply is not sufficient to meet the needs of all.
Outside of California the doctrine provides that ground
water must be equitably apportioned among overlying owners
in times of shortage, with each owner entitled to no more than
his fair and just proportion. 13 9 This is sometimes known as the
eastern correlative rights doctrine. In some instances, particularly in the case of irrigators, the correlative rights doctrine
limits the user to his proportionate share, determined by comparing his surface area with the whole area overlying the water
40
supply.'
Some writers view the correlative rights doctrine as an
attempt to analogize the law of percolating ground water to the
law of surface streams. 4 1 The approach of these two doctrines,
70 P. 663 (Cal. 1902), modified on rehearing, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
'' In addition, the court applied the principles of prior appropriation to transfers
of water beyond overlying land. Thus, as between outside users the first taker has
priority over subsequent users. The Katz case, therefore, represented an effort to unify
the state's groundwater law with its law of surface water streams, which recognized
both riparian and prior appropriation rights. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra,
207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949); Recent Cases, Water and Watercourses-PrescriptiveRights
to Underground Waters-MutualPrescription,34 MINN. L. Rsv. 574 (1950). In a case
decided after Katz it was held that the rights of overlying users are superior to those
of outside users even where the outside use was earlier in time. Burr v. Maclay Rancho
Water Co., 98 P. 260 (Cal. 1908). However, an outside user could gain a prescriptive
right through the adverse taking of nonsurplus waters. City of Pasadena Co. v. City of
Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1949); Comment, The Law of Underground Water: A
Half-Century of Huber v. Merkel, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 491, 501.
231 Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey: Groundwater,24 RUTERS
L. REv. 621, 638-39 (1970).
' Cross, Groundwaters in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.L.Q. 149, 151 (1952).
Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1948);
McHendrie, The'Law of Underground Water, 13 ROcKY MTN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1940). But
see F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION-THE
FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 54.2(b) (3) (1968).
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with their emphasis on common rights to water, is similar.
Using either the surface water reasonable use rule or the correlative rights doctrine, a number of eastern states appear to have
abandoned the American rule.' Other commentators regard
the correlative rights doctrine as an extension or modification
of the American rule.'4 3 However, these two doctrines seem to
rest upon different concepts of water ownership.' Under the
correlative rights doctrine, overlying owners have only usufructuary rights and not, as under the absolute ownership and
American rules, proprietary rights in the corpus of the water
itself.'4 5 It is this concept of a usufructuary right which justifies the requirement that overlying owners share the available
water supply during shortages.' 6 The surface water reasonable
use rule rests on a similar basis.
C.

Common Law Water Rights in Kentucky
1.

Surface Water

Although Kentucky is a riparian state, it was unclear until
recently whether it followed the natural flow doctrine or the
reasonable use rule since the Court often applied the doctrines
interchangeably. Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern -Railway,'47
an early case, is illustrative. The plaintiff in Anderson owned
a grist mill on a small creek. Two miles above the mill the
defendant railroad company constructed a small dam to supply
a reservoir of water for its trains. The dam, however, interferred
with the plaintiff's mill and he brought suit.
The Court declared that "[t]he right of every riparian
owner to the enjoyment of a stream of running water in its
"IJones

v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. 1957);

IacArtor v.

Grayln Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 187 A.2d 417 (Del. 1963); Koch v. Wick, 87 So. 2d
47 (Fla. 1956); Cason v. Florida Power Co., 76 So. 535 (Fla. 1917); Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks Power & Light Co., 117 N.W. 435 (Minn. 1908); Meekerv. City of East
Orange, 74 A. 379 (N.J. 1909); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 89 S.W.2d 889
(Tenn. 1936).
"1

2 W.

HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

635 (1974);

W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 159 (1942).
Kirkwood, Appropriation of PercolatingWater, 1 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1948).
"4 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
727 (1973).
, Hanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey: Groundwater,24 RUTGERS
L. REV. 621, 641 (1970).
"1 5 S.W. 49 (Ky. 1887).
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natural state in flow, quantity, and quality is now well established.""' This language implies that the Court was adopting
the natural flow theory. Later portions of the opinion, however,
suggested the reasonable use rule:
The owner is entitled to the reasonable use of the water
for natural and domestic purposes; but when he undertakes
to divert the course of the stream, or detains the water by
means of a dam so as to prevent the previous supply to other
riparian owners, he becomes a wrongdoer ....
• . . The -use and detention of the water on a large
stream by means of a dam for purposes of the railroad might
not be an unreasonable use, as ordinarily there would be
ample water left for all the purposes of the riparian owner
below; yet where the stream is small, or even large, if the
dam so obstructs the water as to diminish the flow, and lessen the capacity of the water-power below, it is an injury to
the proprietor for which damages may be awarded.'
In the end the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial,
stating that the plaintiff should not recover unless he suffered
material injury from the defendant's use of the water.
In Fackler v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific
5
Co.,' 0 the defendant railroad placed a dam across a small
creek, preventing it from flowing onto the plaintiff's land. The
Court declared that a "proprietor is entitled to have the water
of a stream to flow to his land in its natural course undiminished in quantity and unimpaired in quality."1 51 Relief was
denied, however, because the plaintiff could not show any damage.
In City of Louisville v. Tway,'52 the defendant also
dammed a stream, reducing the velocity of its flow and creating
a pollution problem for the plaintiff. The Court stated:
It is true, as suggested by counsel for appellant, that our court
is committed to the "natural flow rule" though as we read the
two rules (Reasonable Use) . . .the distinction is rather
close, and even under what may be termed the more re' Id. at 51.
"'
"
"'
152

Id. at 52.

17 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1929).
Id. at 195.

180 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. 1944).
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stricted theory [the natural flow doctrine], . . . each riparian owner is recognized as having a privilege to use the
water to supply his natural wants, and extraordinary or artificial uses, so that such does not sensibly or materially affect
the quantity of the water and such uses by a lower riparian
5
owner. 3
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants had made "unreasonable use of the water from the
stream." Thereupon, the Court upheld the lower court's refusal
to grant injunctive relief since the defendant's actions had not
caused any demonstrated harm to the plaintiffs property.
This uncertainty as to which rule applied in Kentucky led
to a legislative adoption of the reasonable use rule in 1954:
The owner of land contiguous to public water shall have
a right to make such reasonable use of water for other than
domestic purposes as will not deny the use of such water to
other owners for domestic purposes or impair existing uses of
other owners heretofore established, or unreasonably interfere with a beneficial use by other owners.' 4
Although this provision was repealed in 1966, the reasonable
use rule appears to be securely established in this state. In
5
Daugherty v. City of Lexington,'1
the most recent case on
point, the City of Lexington denied a building permit to the
plaintiff, who had planned to build a restaurant, because he
failed to show that his septic tank system would not endanger
the purity of city water in a nearby reservoir. The plaintiff
argued that his proposed restaurant would be a reasonable use
of his land and would not endanger the nearby reservoir. The
Court quoted a Michigan case, People v. Hulbert,'6 which set
forth a reasonable use formula for water:
[I]n determining whether a use is reasonable we must consider what the use is for, its extent, duration, necessity, and
its application; the nature and size of the stream, and the
several uses to which it is put; the extent of the injury to the
'

Id. at 280.

1954 Ky. Acts, ch. 247, § 2. This statute, however, was repealed in 1966. See
1966 Ky. Acts, ch. 23, § 39. There is no similar provision in KRS ch. 151 (1976),
Kentucky's present water resources legislation.
"s

249 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1952).
91 N.W. 211 (Mich. 1902).
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one proprietor and of the benefit to the other; and all other
facts which may bear upon the reasonableness of the use."'
According to the Court, reasonable use is a question of fact to
be settled by a balancing test: The necessity of the water use
must be balanced against the harm which would ensue from
the use.
Kentucky, like most eastern jurisdictions, limits the use of
surface water to riparian land. In Bank of Hopkinsville v. Western Kentucky Asylum for the Insane,"8 the defendant purchased a small tract of land on a stream, constructed a pumping station, and transported the water for use on nonriparian
land located about three-quarters of a mile away. This diversion interfered with the operation of the plaintiff's grist mill
and he brought suit to enjoin this nonriparian use. The Court
agreed that the hospital could not transport the water to a
nonriparian tract if this caused injury to a riparian owner.
Kentucky apparently also recognizes prescriptive rights.
In W. G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones,"9 a coal company obtained
the right to pollute a stream because the lower riparian owner
allowed the defendant's use to continue throughout the statutory prescriptive period.
2.

Ground Water

Like most states, Kentucky recognizes the legal distinction
between underground streams and percolating ground water.
In Nourse v. Andrews,160 a plaintiff owning land on the Muddy
River in Logan County tried to prevent the City of Russellville
from using two springs for its water supply since this depleted
the river. The plaintiff argued that the springs were part of the
source of the river but lost the case when he was unable to
prove this allegation. The Court stated that one who alleges the
existence of an underground stream has the burden of proof
and added that:
Subterranean streams, as distinguished from subterranean
percolations, are governed by the same rules, and give rise to
'

Id. at 217.

56 S.W. 525 (Ky. 1900).
' 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953).

255 S.W. 84 (Kv. 1923).
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the same rights and obligations, as flowing surface streams
S. .. The owner of the land under which a stream flows
can, therefore, maintain an action for the diversion of it, if
such diversion took place under the same circumstances as
would have enabled him to recover, if the stream had been
wholly above ground. 6 '
Therefore, according to the Nourse case, a landowner may
assert riparian rights to underground water only if he can prove
the existence of an underground stream. In Commonwealth v.
Sebastian,6 ' such proof was established by pointing to a line
of green grass which flourished in spite of dry weather. The
Court in Sebastian also stated that "there is an initial presumption that subterranean waters are percolating, but once a
subterranean stream is shown to exist, there arises a presump' 63
tion that it has a fixed and definite course and channel.'
In the case of percolating ground water, Kentucky originally followed the absolute ownership rule. In Kinnard v. Standard Oil Co.' 4 the Court stated that percolating waters "belong
to the soil, constitute part of it, and may be used, controlled,
or removed by the owner in the same manner that he could the
soil through which the water percolates or runs."'6 5 In Long v.
Louisville & Nashville Railway Co.'1 6 the Court declared that
"[t]he rule is universal that the owner may dig on his own
land such wells as he needs, although in doing so he may dig
up his neighbor's well."'' 7 The doctrine was reaffirmed in
68
Nourse v. Andrews:
Percolating waters are part of the earth itself, as much as the
soil and stones, with the same absolute right of use and appropriation by the owner of the land. . . .The law seems to
be well settled that water percolating through the soil is not,
and cannot, be distinguished from the soil itself. The owner
of the soil is entitled to the waters percolating through it, and
such water is not subject to the appropriation.
"I,
Id. at 86.
162345 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1961).
,' Id. at 47.

12 S.W. 937 (Ky. 1890).
'5 Id. at 938.

107 S.W. 203 (Ky. 1908).
' Id. at 205.

255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky. 1923).
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The absolute ownership rule, however, was replaced by the
American rule of reasonable use in Sycamore Coal Co. v.
Stanley."I In that case, the plaintiff brought suit when the
defendant coal company's core hole, used to test for coal,
caused the water in his well to disappear. The defendant
plugged the hole, but the water rose only fourteen inches, as
compared to the previous fifty-four inch level. Since there was
no evidence of an underground stream, the waters were assumed to be percolating. The Court limited the landowner over
subterranean percolating waters to the "reasonable and beneficial use of the waters . . . and he had no right to waste them,
whether through malice or indifference, if, by such waste, he
injures a neighboring landowner. 1 7 Since the landowner's use
was "propirly connected with the use, enjoyment and development of the land itself," the Court held that he was entitled to
all he could use, regardless of the depletion of his neighbor's
7
supply.1 1
D.

An Evaluation of Common Law Water Rights

Unfortunately, the riparian system is not responsive to the
needs of many water users. Ideally, water rights should be both
definite and secure: The water right should be clearly defined
with respect to quantity and in terms of its relation to the
rights of other users. The reasonable use rule, however, is vague
and uncertain; 72 one cannot know with any precision who may
use the available water, how much can be used, or for what
purpose it can be used. 73 This uncertainty exists because any
use must be reasonable with respect to the uses of other riparian owners, and these uses are constantly changing.'
The uncertain nature of the user's water right under the
riparian system is further aggravated because mechanisms for
resolving controversies among water users are severely limited.
Not only is litigation time consuming, expensive, and uncer"' 166 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1942).
"'

Id. at 249.

171Id.

I" Teass, Water and Water Courses-RiparianRights-Diversion of Storm or
Flood Waters for Use on NonriparianLands, 18 VA. L. REv. 223, 237-38 (1932).
"
Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism,35 Mo. L. REv. 1, 13 (1970).
" Davis, Australianand American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 647, 680 (1968).
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tain in its outcome, but the results of successful litigation are
often narrow and limited in scope. First, the judgment relates
only to the parties before the court and not other water users.
Since the courts will usually not apportion a stream between
competing users, the judgment will be "all or nothing" for one
party or another. Moreover, a judgment pertains only to the
present facts, and new developments which change the relative
positions of the parties cannot adequately be dealt with absent
further litigation. 7 '
Another criticism is that the riparian system tends to foster locational inefficiencies.' 76 In most states it restricts excessively the use of the water by nonriparian landowners.' 77 Since
many beneficial uses consume water some distance from the
point of diversion, these locational restrictions probably result
in less efficient water use. 78 Thus, while the riparian system
possesses the advantage of flexibility, insecurity of the water
right and locational restrictions do not promote efficient water
use.
As far as ground water allocation doctrines are concerned,
the correlative rights doctrine seems to be more equitable than
either the absolute ownership doctrine or 'the American rule
since small users are better protected and because the effects
of a water shortage are borne proportionately by all users. In
addition, hydrological considerations favor the correlative
rights doctrine. Both hydrologists and legal commentators
have criticized the existing law of water rights for its failure 7to9
recognize the relationship between surface and ground water.
This interrelation between percolating ground water and surface water supports a uniform allocation rule for all forms of
water.' 80 Only the correlative rights doctrine sufficiently resemI75Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism,35

Mo. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1970).

7I Davis, Australianand American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 647, 680 (1968).
177 Farnham, Improvement and Modernization of New York Water Law Within
the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 377, 413 (1968);
Marquis, Freeman & Heath, Movement for the New Water Rights Laws, 23 Te7NN.-L.
REv. 797, 832 (1955).
I7sLevi & Schneeberger, The Chain and Unity of Title Theories for Delineating
RiparianLands: Economic Analysis as an Alternative to Case Precedent, 21 BUFFALO
L. REv. 439, 443-47 (1972).
,79 Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water: What is Their Future Common
Ground, 7 WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW. 12 (1958).
191Kirkwood, Appropriationof Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1948).
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bles the surface water reasonable use rule, both in terms of an
allocative standard and in terms of an underlying theory of
to fashion a
property interest in the water, to allow the courts
18 1
rational and integrated law of water allocation.
On the other hand, the correlative rights doctrine is subject to many of the same criticisms as the surface water reasonable use rule. The correlative rights rule is so indefinite that it
is exceedingly difficult to apply to varying conditions. 82 Moreover, it offers no security to early developers by protecting the
water supply on which they have relied, nor does it permit
landowners to acquire a more secure right to an adequate supply of water by purchase or contract.'83

A.

If. STATE REGULATION OF CONSUMPTIVE WATER USES
Water Use Permits in the East

Since water has usually been plentiful in the East, the
common law system, despite its many deficiencies, has generally provided a satisfactory framework for water allocation.
Since World War II, however, a number of states, including
Kentucky, have modified these common law doctrines through
legislation. Although some states considered adoption of the
western system of prior appropriation,'84 most have preferred
hybrid systems possessing characteristics of both riparianism
and prior appropriation.'
At present, eleven eastern states regulate consumptive
water uses with a permit system,'88 while the common law rules
remain in seventeen states.'8 7 So far, Mississippi is the only
"IHanks & Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RUTGERS
L. REV. 621, 645 (1970).
I,2 McHendrie, The Law of Underground Water, 13 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1, 6
(1940).
"' Note, PercolatingWater Law-Theories of Ownership and Problems of Distribution in the Western United States, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1419, 1425 (1955).
"1 Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Virginia. See F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS & J. MORRIS, A MODEL

WATER CODE

76 (1972).

"I For a discussion of these statutes, see NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY
DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS (R. Dewsnut & D. Jensen eds. 1973).
In Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
"I Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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eastern state to adopt the prior appropriation system of the
8
West. 1
As a practical matter, few permit systems in the East are
very comprehensive. For example, Indiana, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and South Carolina regulate only ground water and
require permits only in those areas where ground water supplies
are inadequate to meet existing demand.' 9 Moreover, Indiana,
Minnesota, and North Carolina exempt existing users, either
partly or entirely, from regulation,' while Kentucky, Delaware, and Maryland exempt other classes of users as well."'1
Only Iowa and Florida have truly comprehensive water
regulation systems. The Iowa statute, enacted in 1957, established a permit system under the control of the Natural Resources Council, administered by a water commissioner, which
regulates rights to both surface and ground water.'92 Although
the law purports to leave unimpaired all "vested rights," it
regulates both existing and unused rights to water." 3 The Iowa
law requires that all substantial uses of water be "beneficial."
That term is defined to mean the application of water to a
useful purpose inuring to the benefit of the water user and
subject to his dominion and control.'94 Permits are issued by
the water commissioner. These permits have a general limitation of ten years, and the law prohibits the diversion, storage,
or withdrawal of water for most substantial uses from any natural watercourse, underground basin or watercourse, drainage
ditch, or settling basin (except for ordinary household purposes
and use for domestic animals) without a permit." 5 The water
"'

MISS. CODE ANN.

§§

51-3-1 to -53 (1972). See also Champion, PriorAppropria-

tion in Mississippi:A StatutoryAnalysis, 39 Miss. L.J. 1 (1967).
"' IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2-5 (Bums 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1-36 (West 1966);
S.C. CODE § 70-36 (Supp. 1975). North Carolina, which regulates both surface and
ground water, also restricts its permit system to limited "capacity use areas." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13 (Supp. 1975).
"' IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2-5 (Bums 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38 (West
Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.16(e) (Supp. 1975).
"' KRS § 151.140 (1976); DEL. CODE § 7-6103(1) (Supp. 1970); MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 8-802(b) (1974).
"I See generally Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit
System, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 499 (1967); Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the
Iowa Water Permit System-PartII, 8 NAT. RasouRcEs J. 23 (1968).
,' IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.21 (West 1971).
...IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.1 (West 1971).
193
IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.25 (West 1971).
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commissioner may suspend the operation of permits if necessary during an emergency and establish priorities for water

distribution, thus protecting the public interest. 8'
In Florida, the Water Resources Act of 1972 established an
elaborate structure for the regulatibn of consumptive water
uses." 7 At the state level, the Department of Environmental
Regulation oversees the administration of the Act.' However,
the state is divided into five water management districts and
the governing boards of these districts are primarily responsible
for the operation of the permit system.'9 '
Permit applications under the Florida Act must demonstrate that the proposed use is a reasonable-beneficial one, will
not interfere with any presently existing legal use, and is consistent with the public interest.2"0 "Reasonable-beneficial use"
is defined as "the use of water in such quantity as is necessary
for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose and in a
manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest. ' 2 ' A permit may be issued for up to twenty years
and as long as fifty years if the permittee is a municipality,
public works, or public service corporation.2 2 Also, a permit
may be modified or renewed prior to the expiration date.0 '
Finally, each district is required to formulate a plan of classification to determine which users are to be given priority of use
during periods of water shortage. 24 A "shortage" within the
meaning of the Act exists when there is insufficient water to
satisfy permit requirements, or when reduction in water use is
25
necessary to protect water sources from serious harm.
§ 455A.28(3) (West 1971).
ch. 72-299; now codified as FiA. STAT. ANN. ch. 373 (West
1975). The author, with Dean Frank E. Maloney of the University of Florida, was codraftsman of this legislation.
I FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.026 (West 1975). The functions of the Department of
Natural Resources were transferred to the Department of Environmental Regulation
by 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-22. See Landers, Functions of the Department of Environmental Regulation, 50 FLA. B.J. 269 (1976).
"I FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.083 (West 1975).
Id. at § 373.223.
=' Id. at § 373.019(5).
2 Id. at § 373.236(1)-(2).
" Id. at § 373.239.
' Id. at § 373.246(1).
Id. at § 373.246(2).
'" IOWA CODE ANN.
"1 1972 Fla. Laws,
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Water Use Permits in Kentucky

Kentucky made the first significant legislative change in
its common law system in 1954. The droughts of the two preceding years caused many farmers to divert water from nearby
streams and lakes in order to satisfy their water needs. This
increased use of surface water demonstrated the need for a
more satisfactory definition of riparian rights in Kentucky."'
Consequently, the legislature set forth in the 1954 Act a basic
statement of the rights of landowners in such waters.
The 1954 Act applied to "public water" which included
contained surface water and ground water, but not diffused
surface water. Section 3 of the Act set forth the rights of landowners to use the public waters of the state. The Act provided
that the use of water by a riparian owner for domestic purposes
would have priority over other uses and declared that riparian
owners
shall have a right to make such reasonable use of water for
other than domestic purposes as will not deny the use of such
water to other owners for domestic purposes or impair existing uses of other owners heretofore established, or unreasonably interfere with a beneficial use by other owners.0 7
Finally, the Act allowed riparians to impound and store water
on their land under certain conditions as long as this would not
injure the rights of other users.
In 1966 the original Act was repealed and replaced by Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 151, a riore comprehensive
law.2"' The Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection administers the new Act.2 9 Consumptive
uses of water, as well as the construction of dams and impoundments, are regulated. In addition, the legislation provides for
water resources planning and authorizes construction for flood
control and water development purposes.2 10
2" For a discussion of the 1954 Act, see Gregory, RiparianRights-Analysis of New
Statutory Provisions, 43 Ky. L.J. 407 (1955).
21 1954 Ky. Acts, ch. 247.
1 1966 Ky. Acts, ch. 23.
2" KRS § 151.125 (1976).
210 Water resource planning and development is also promoted by the Common-

wealth's Water Resources Authority, established by KRS § 151.330 (1976). The Authority is "empowered to coordinate the programs of all state agencies in the conserva-
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One of the most significant features of the 1966 Act is the
permit system by which the Department regulates diversions
and consumptive uses of public water. The statute declares
that "no person, business, industry, city, county, water district, or other political subdivision" may withdraw, divert or
transfer public water unless a permit is first obtained from the
Department.2 1' According to another section, "public water"
includes "[w]ater occurring in any stream, lake, ground
water, subterranean water, or other body of water in the Commonwealth which may be applied to any useful or beneficial
purpose. 212 Permits are usually issued after an inspection by
the Department to determine whether the applicant's proposed
use is consistent with the statutory requirements. When the
circumstances warrant, the Department may allow less water
than the applicant has requested, and permits may be
amended at the request of either the Department or the permittee.
The Act further provides that "any person aggrieved" by
an order, determination, regulation, or ruling of Department
personnel may appeal to the Secretary for a formal quasijudicial hearing.2 1 Public notice must be given and the hearing
is open to the public. The Department may issue subpoenas,
administer oaths, and examine witnesses. On the basis of the
evidence produced at the hearing, the Secretary makes findings
of facts and conclusions of law and enters a decision or final
order. The Act allows for judicial review of these proceedings,
but the scope of this review is limited, and findings of fact by
tion, development, and wise use of public water," and simultaneously to "promote the
beneficial and proper distribution of water throughout the Commonwealth." KRS §
151.360 (1976). A special revolving trust fund, known as the Water Resources Fund,
has been established, from which the Water Resources Authority is authorized to make
loans and expenditures. KRS § 151.380 (1976). In addition, the Authority is authorized
to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of financing water development projects. KRS
§ 151.420 (1976). Another important function of the Water Resources Authority is to
contract with agencies of the federal government, primarily the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, in order to obtain water supply space in federal reservoirs. KRS § 151.360(1)
(1976).
211KRS § 151.140 (1976).
21 KRS § 151.120(1) (1976). However, neither diffused surface water, as defined
in KRS § 151.100(5), nor water left standing in pools in a natural stream when the flow
of the stream has ceased, are regarded as public waters. KRS § 151.120(2) (1976).
213 KRS § 151.170(2) (1976).
214KRS § 151.180 (1976).
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the Department are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. ,5
Once a permit is issued, the water user must keep accurate
records of all water withdrawn, diverted, or transferred and
submit periodic reports to the Department.2 16 The Department
may, after warning, order the suspension or revocation of a
permit if the owner fails to comply with the conditions of his
permit or with provisions of the Act or with related orders, rules
or regulations.2 17 In addition, the Department may enforce the
provisions of the Act in a number of other ways. It may issue a
cease and desist order against one who makes a withdrawal,
diversion, or transfer of public water without obtaining the
necessary permit. 2 8 The Department may also institute court
proceedings to enforce its orders.21 9 Moreover, unauthorized
diversions of public water, 220 as well as other violations of the
Act, may subject the violator to civil penalties of up to one
2
thousand dollars per day. '
C.

Statutory Water Use Rights

Kentucky's present water resources law, like consumptive
water use legislation in other eastern states, has created a
scheme of statutory water use rights which are superimposed
upon the older system of common law rules. This section will
examine the nature of these water use rights and the way they
operate in Kentucky.
1.

PriorAppropriationElements

Although Kentucky's statutory water use rights differ from
those at common law, they strongly resemble western water
rights. For example, water rights are available to more potential users under present Kentucky law than under the common
law rules. In the East, surface water rights are based on ownership of riparian land while rights to ground water arise from the
215KRS
216KRS
217KRS
21AKRS
21, KRS

§ 151.190 (1976).
§ 151.190 (1976).
§ 151.125(9) (1976).
§ 151.125(10) (1976).
§§ 151.125(11), .460 (1976).

KRS § 151.150(2) (1976).
-1 KRS § 151.990 (1976).
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ownership of overlying land. Under prior appropriation, water
rights are derived from beneficial use of the water and not from
land ownership. In Kentucky, as in the West, beneficial use
rather than ownership of land also appears to be the basis of
permit rights. The Act states that no permit shall be denied "to
a responsible applicant who has established an amount of
water for which he has a need for a useful purpose" and there
is no requirement that the applicant be a riparian owner."
Furthermore, municipalities, which are considered nonriparians in most states, are specifically mentioned as eligible applicants.2
The Kentucky Act also requires permits to be specific in
terms of quantity, time, place, and rate of diversion, transfer,
or withdrawal.22 4 Under the riparian system, the water user
merely has the right to make a reasonable use of the available
surface water. Under each of the "common law" ground water
doctrines, the water right is likewise unquantified, but under
prior appropriation, the water right is fixed in terms of time,
location and quantity. In this respect the Kentucky Act resembles the prior appropriation system rather than common law
allocative doctrines.
Duration of the water right is an important aspect of any
water allocation system. Water rights under the prior appropriation system are perpetual in nature although they can be lost
or abandoned through nonuse. Riparian rights are also perpetual since they are appurtenant to the land, but the continuing
right to make a particular use of water (except for domestic
uses) is indefinite in duration under the reasonable use rule
since changing circumstances may compel an existing user to
modify his water use or cease use altogether in order to accommodate new users. In contrast, most permit systems in the East
place time limits on the permits and require periodic renewal. 211 The Kentucky Act, however, does not specify any particular time limit, nor does it contain any provisions for re= KRS § 151.170 (1976). A modified watershed rule, however, is applied: KRS §
151.200(2) (1976) provides that permits which allow a use beyond the watershed must
be authorized by the Department with the approval of the Water Resources Authority.
m KRS §§ 151.140-.150 (1976).
" KRS § 151.170(1) (1976).
22 See, e.g., MODEL WATER ACT § 406 (50 years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.20 (10
years); MODEL WATER CODE § 2.06 (20 years, 50 years for municipalities).
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newal. This omission, a serious deficiency in the Act, will be
discussed further in a subsequent portion of this article.
2. Security of Statutory Water Use Rights
Water rights must also be secure in order to encourage
investment in productive water uses. 22 As one economist

noted, however, there are various aspects to the concept of
security. 22 Legal security means protection against the unlawful acts of others, 22 8 while physical security is concerned with

protection against fluctuations in streamflow or ground water
level due to climatic or other natural conditions. 29 Tenure se-

curity involves protection against the lawful acts of government or other private users. At the present time, lack of tenure
security is a particularly serious problem with statutory water
rights in Kentucky.
As stated earlier, the Department may suspend or revoke
a permit if the water user violates the conditions of his permit
or the provisions of the Act. In addition, the Department may
subsequently modify the terms of a permit after it has been
granted when the requirements of the permit holder have
changed appreciably.2 ° Moreover, even in normal circumstances, the permit holder's status vis-a-vis the Department appears to be analogous to that of a tenant at will. The Act
declares that "such permits represent a limited right of use and
do not vest ownership nor an absolute right to withdraw or use
the water.

12 3

' Since the Act does not provide for permits of a

specific duration, the Department might revoke the permit of
an existing user in order to make the water available to another
applicant. Even if the courts would protect a permit holder

"I

Trelease, Alternatives to Appropriation Law, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 283,
287 (1976). But see Anderson & Rogers, Time-Limited Water Permits: Legal and
Economic Considerations, 12 GoNz. L. REv. 193, 226-29 (1977).
227 Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteriafor a System of Water
Rights, 32 LAND ECON. 295 (1956).
z" This also requires an effective mechanism for adjudicating disputes among
water users. Trelease, A Model State Water Codefor River Basin Development, 22 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 301, 312 (1957).
22 Physical security can be increased through the construction of impoundments
and other structures to store water during periods of high flow for use.
' KRS § 151.170(4) (1976).
21'KRS § 151.170(1) (1976).
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from arbitrary action by the Department on constitutional
grounds,? 2 the status of his statutory water right is nevertheless
uncertain.
a. Other Permit Holders
Under the Kentucky Act a permit holder is only partly
protected against the acts of other permitees. Existing permit
holders are protected against new regulated users by a provision which states that a permit application will be granted only
if the proposed use "will not be detrimental to the . . . rights
of other public water users" and if "the requested amount of
water is available."' 3 In this respect statutory water use rights
are more secure than common law water use rights, since existing water users were not protected against the initiation of new
uses at common law. However, in Kentucky, once a permit is
actually secured, older water uses are not superior to newer
uses during periods of water shortage. The Act provides that
during periods of "drought, emergency, or other similar situations," the Department, with the permission of the Water Resources Authority, may suspend the operation of the permit
system and temporarily allocate available water supplies on
some other basis.24 The statute speaks of "situations requiring
a balancing of the rights and available water between water
users" - language which suggests the riparian reasonable use
rule. Nevertheless, the statute gives very little indication of
how the Department will allocate the available water. A permit
holder has no idea where he stands when some water uses must
be curtailed; thus, he is left without protection by the Act at
the very time when he needs it most.
b.

Unregulated Water Users

The security of permit holders is also compromised by the
large number of water users who are exempted from regulation
2 One of the most significant developments in administrative law has been the

extension of due process protection to license holders and other recipients of governmental largesse. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 543 (1972) (public employment); Bell
v. Bursen, 402 U.S. 434 (1971) (driver's license). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.11-.10 (Supp. 1970); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
KRS § 151.170(2) (1976).
" KRS § 151.200(1) (1976).
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by the Act."5 These include domestic users, agricultural users
and irrigators, uses exempted by administrative regulation,
steam-generating plants, and water injected underground in
connection with oil and gas production.
The exemption for domestic use reflects the high priority
given to such uses under the riparian doctrine. Sectior
151.100(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes2 3 defines
"domestic use" as "the use of water for ordinary household
purposes, and drinking water for poultry, livestock and domestic animals." Domestic uses are often exempted from regulation in eastern states27 because it is impractical to regulate
numerous small users; individual domestic users collectively
account for a relatively small amount of the total water demand; and regulation of municipal waterworks and other public water suppliers can effectively control domestic consumption in urban areas.238
The agricultural exemption is more significant. In 1970,
irrigation in Kentucky averaged about 7,000,000 gallons per
day on 25,000 acres of land. 239 Tobacco is the principal crop
using irrigation waters, and if a drought year occurs, some
24
36,000 acres would require 4,320,000,000 gallons of watery.
In addition, no permit is required "if the amount of water
withdrawn, diverted or transferred is less than the amount established by regulation. '24' The Department now exempts from
the permit system those who use less than 10,000 gallons per
2
day. 2
The 1966 Act originally exempted many manufacturing
and industrial users from the permit requirements, provided
that the water was returned in substantially the same quantity
21

The exemptions are listed in KRS § 151.140 (1976).

KRS § 151.100(1)(1976).
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.219(1)(West 1974); IOWA CODE ANN.
1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (West 1977).

§ 455A.1

(West

21 F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS & J. MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE 178 (1972).
2" WATER INFORMATION CENTER, INC., WATER

ATLAS, plates 79-80 (1973).

M4D.

TARLOCK, EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF DIVERSION, TRANSFER,
STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER IN KENTUCKY 36 (Univ. of Ky. Water Resources

Research Inst. Rept. No. 15, 1968).
-' KRS § 151.140 (1976). This exemption was created as a result of a 1974 amend-

ment to KRS § 151.140 requested by the Department.
"I Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.15 (1974) (100,000 gal. per day); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:1-37 (West 1966) (70 gal. per minute); S.C. CODE § 70-36 (Supp. 1975) (100,000
gal. per day).
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and condition as when it was withdrawn. This provision was
repealed in 1972, leaving only steam-generating facilities still
exempt. Fihally, the use of water for secondary recovery operations remains exempt from the permit requirements.
These exemptions are certain to cause eventual problems
between regulated and unregulated water users. As noted, no
regulated user can obtain a permit to initiate a new water use
unless sufficient water is available to meet the needs of all
existing users. This provision protects unregulated users
against permit holders. However, permit holders do not receive
comparable protection against subsequent acts by unregulated
users. Suppose, for example, a farmer begins to divert water
from an adjacent stream in order to irrigate his land and this
reduces the amount of water available to a downstream permit
holder.2 13 What recourse does the permit holder have against

the upstream riparian owner? It is doubtful that the Department could prevent the farmer's action since agricultural users
are exempted from regulation. 44
In fact, a provision of Section 151.140, which declares that
"nothing herein shall interfere with the use of water for agricultural . . . purposes, including irrigation," strongly suggests

that agricultural users, along with domestic users, have been
placed in a preferential water use category by the legislature.
Therefore, unless a court grants relief to the permit holder on
equitable grounds, it would seem that the permit holder is at

the mercy of such an unregulated water user. 245 From the per-

mit holder's point of view, therefore, his statutory water right
is somewhat tenuous.
Moreover, it is not clear whether water users exempted
from regulation are subject to regulation during water shor213 The same situation could arise if an unregulated user increased the amount of
water he was applying to an existing use. For example, the farmer in the illustration
above might increase the number of acres irrigated from 100 to 200, or he might switch
to a crop requiring twice as much water per acre as before. In either case this would
reduce the total amount of water available to other water users.
244 KRS § 151.140(2) (1976).
25 One might ask whether a permit holder would still possess common law rights
as a riparian landowner. If so he might sue in that capacity to enforce his rights under
the reasonable use rule against the "unreasonable" uses of the unregulated riparian
owners. However, if this is the case, the water use permit would be almost useless to
such users and there would be little accomplished by subjecting them to regulation in
the first place.
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tageds.Section 151.200(1) states that the Department may
"allocate the available public water supply among water users"
and "restrict the water withdrawal rights of permit holders."' 2
This language is ambiguous and possibly inconsistent unless
"water users" is synonymous with "permit holders." However,
the statute dealing with the exemptions, which states that
"nothing herein shall interfere with the use of water for agricultural and domestic purposes including irrigation,' '247 suggests
that the entire Act, including the provisions of Section
151.200(1), are inapplicable to these two exempted categories.2 48 In other words, permit holders will be forced to reduce
their consumption of water during a drought while farmers and
other unregulated users will be free to continue and even increase their water use. This is not only highly inequitable, but
it is certain to undermine the confidence of water users in the
integrity of the water regulatory system.

M.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION: A SHORT-RANGE

PROPOSAL
Kentucky's present water regulatory law is defective because it exempts too many classes of water users from regulation; it fails to define clearly the rights of water users during
periods of temporary water shortage; and it places no time
liait on the water use permit. These are serious weaknesses
which severely compromise the effectiveness of the state's
water regulatory policy. This portion of the article proposes
new legislation to deal with these and other deficiencies.
Since water supplies in Kentucky are expected to be sufficient in the near future, the proposed legislation reflects a philosophy of minimal government regulation. While allocative
regulations may be necessary during a water shortage, it is poor
public policy to deny water to some users when sufficient water
is presently available to satisfy the needs of all. Instead, this
proposal seeks to encourage efficient and productive use of
211KRS § 151.200(1) (1976) (emphasis added).

247KRS § 151.140 (1976).
211However, KRS § 151.140 merely states that "no permit shall be required" for
other classes of exempt uses such as small uses, steam generation, and oil and gas
production. Conceivably, the Department may have some authority to regulate these
uses under KRS § 151.200(1) during periods of water shortage.
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water resources by both public and private users. The best way
to accomplish this goal is to replace common law water rights
with statutory water rights which are definite, secure, and
available to all potential users.
Nevertheless, the proposal is a short-range one. Eventually, in perhaps thirty-five or forty years, most of the available
water in the state will be fully utilized. At that time the legislature must be prepared to replace this short-range program with
a more comprehensive regulatory framework which can allocate a limited supply of water among various competing users.
A few of the alternatives for such a long-range program will be
examined in Part V.
A.

Exempted Users

Kentucky's present system of water rights is two-tiered. At
the top are water users whose rights are based on common law
doctrines and who are exempted from regulation. Below them
are the permit holders, whose water rights are statutory. As we
have seen, the existence of these two incompatible sources of
water rights creates significant problems for both the regulatory agency and the water users themselves. Accordingly, we
recommend that the common law water rights regarding both
surface water and ground water be replaced with a single statutory water right. This would have at least two beneficial results: First, water rights would be more specific in terms of
quantity, .as well as time, place, and rate of withdrawal; second, common law place-of-use restrictions would be abolished"9 and water would be made available to more users. 0
This would be particularly helpful to municipal public water
suppliers and some industrial users.
Only domestic users would remain completely exempt
from regulation."' These users, taken collectively, do not ac"IPossibly the

regulatory agency should retain the right to reject permit applica-

tions that involve transfers of water beyond the watershed from which it is withdrawn.
15 It will probably be necessary to allow nonriparian landowners to condemn
rights-of-way in order that they may obtain physical access to the watercourse. Legislation permitting the exercise of eminent domain by private parties for this purpose is

common in the western states. 1 R.
274-82 (1971).

HuTcHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN

WESTERN STATES

-' KRS § 151.100(1) (1976) defines "domestic use" as "the use of water for ordinary household purposes, and drinking water for poultry, livestock and domestic ani-
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count for a significant portion of water use in most areas and
it would be costly and probably futile to try to regulate them.
An exemption would give domestic users a preferred status in
the proposed water rights scheme, but this is no different from
their status at common law.25 2 Needless to say, only individuals
would be exempt from regulation; water companies and municipal water suppliers would be required to obtain permits.
In addition, the regulatory agency, for reasons of economy
or administrative convenience, should also have the power to
exempt small-scale nondomestic users from the permit requirements. However, these water users should continue to be regulated insofar as other provisions of the proposed act are concerned. For example, the agency should retain the right to
regulate nondomestic small users, along with other non-exempt
water users, during periods of temporary water shortage.
B.

The Beneficial Use Standard

We believe that statutory water rights should be based on
the concept of beneficial use. Beneficial use has been defined
as "the use of such a quantity of water, when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are exercised in its application for a lawful purpose, as is economically necessary for that
purpose."' 3 For more than a century water rights in the West
have been based on the beneficial use standard,' 54 and recently
this concept has been recognized in the East.25 5
Beneficial use, however, is an absolute rather than a relative standard: A proposed water use is either beneficial or
wasteful; beneficial uses are permitted, while wasteful or nonbeneficial ones are not.21 This means that a regulatory agency
mals." See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.1 (West 1971).
212 Winters v. Berea College, 349 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1961); Note, Acquisition of the
Right to Use Water, 29 TUL. L. REv. 554, 556 (1955). As a technical matter, the
preferred status of domestic users at common law extends to surface water and underground streams but not to percolating ground water.

TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7476 (Vernon 1954).

Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 119 (C.C.D. Nev. 1897); Tulare
Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935).
2

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.109(5) (West 1975); IowA CODE ANN. § 455A.21 (West

1971).
The concept of "duty of water" is an aspect of the beneficial use standard:
It is that measure of water, which by careful management and use,
without wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of

211
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would not attempt to characterize one use as "more beneficial"
than another for purposes of allocating water. Instead, the
agency would continue to award water use permits on a "first
come, first served" basis as long as the proposed use was beneficial and water was available. As noted, the present Kentucky
Act seems to use this approach already. We recommend that
the state continue to grant water use permits on the basis of
beneficial use, but the term should be defined and explicitly
incorporated into the regulatory structure.
C.

Duration of Water Right

In Part II, the present Kentucky Act was criticized because
the water rights created by it are insecure. Accordingly, as part
of the short-range plan we suggest that water users be granted
a permit of fixed duration for thirty years. This statutory water
right should be expressly recognized as a property right which
could not be revoked before its termination date unless the
permit holder violates the statute or voluntarily terminates his
water use. The permit should also be renewable, though not as
a matter of right. In addition, the agency should provide a
procedure by which rights can be determined expeditiously and
inexpensively.
Although it might be argued that this approach achieves
security at the expense of flexibility, it commits the state only
for thirty to forty years. Because of the durational limit, permits will begin to expire in the first decade of the next century.
If the situation has changed by then to a water-scarce environment, the legislature will have ample time to design a new
allocation system to deal with these changed conditions.
land for such a period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a
maximum amount of such crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.
Farmers Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (Colo. 1954). See also
5 WATER & WATER RIGHTS § 408.2 (R. Clark, ed. 1972). Some western states have
carried this principle a step further and imposed statutory limitations upon the quantity of water per acre that may be appropriated for purposes of irrigation. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-202 (Supp. 1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-231, 240, 242 (1968); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 82, § 33 (West 1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-5-6 (1967). Perhaps the
water regulatory agency in Kentucky should be authorized to adopt similar guidelines
for use in evaluating certain classes of permit applications.
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Water Right Transfers

Water rights must be transferable if water is to move from
less productive uses to more productive uses in response to
market forces. However, voluntary transfers are generally prohibited in the East under both common law doctrines and regulatory legislation. Even' where such transfers are permitted,
tenure insecurity sometimes discourages potential buyers. In
excessive transacaddition, lack of information contributes 25to
7
transfers.
efficient
inhibits
tion costs and
Spillover costs, which arise because of the interrelated
nature of water use, also present serious difficulties.25 Many
spillover cost problems involve the return flow of surface
watercourses.2 11 Most water uses do not make full consumptive
use of the water, but instead return some of it to the watercourse from which it was taken. When a transfer or a change in
water use occurs, it may reduce the amount of water that is
returned to the stream to the detriment of downstream users.
Economists have proposed a number of solutions to the problem of spillover costs. One alternative is simply to prohibit
transfers which have significant spillover effects.2 Another
is to allow affected downstream users to recover damages for
their injuries. 2 1 This would discourage transfers when the
spillover costs exceed the benefits to transacting parties.
21 Hartman & Seastone, Welfare Goals and Organizationof Decision-Makingfor
the Allocation of Water Resources, 41 LAND EcoN. 21, 22 (1965). For example, accurate
records of water rights promote marketability. Garton, South Dakota's System of
Water Management and Its Relation to Land Use and Economic Development, 21
S.D.L. REv. 1, 46 (1976).
2 Spillover costs occur when an action by one person imposes uncompensated
costs on others which are not borne by him. In terms of welfare, these conditions reduce
the capacity of the market to achieve an optional allocation of resources. L. HARTMAN
& D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONoMic EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS
2 (1970).

"I Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Pub-

lic Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 27 (1965).
28 Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making:A Critique, 2 J. LAw &
EcoN. 41, 46 (1959).
21 J.HISHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SuPPLY-EcONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND PoLICY 235 (1960).
282 Another solution to the return-flow problem would be to grant a water user a
right to all water that is diverted,'including what would otherwise be returned to the
stream. Comment, Toward the Maximization of a Resource: The 1971 Washington
Water Resources Act, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 759, 772-73 (1974). This solution would also
encourage water users to use new techniques to reduce the amount of water needed
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Temporary Water Shortages

The present Kentucky Act takes a rather casual approach
to the problem of temporary water shortages. Although water
shortages are infrequent in Kentucky's present water-rich environment, this is precisely the situation in which water rights
should provide the user with some protection and security.
Our short-range plan would require the regulatory agency
to formulate in advance a plan for use during any future period
of water shortage. 63 Among other things, this plan should specify the method for apportioning the available water among the
various permit holders in the affected area. Although this may
commit the agency to a particular course of action at a time
when more flexibility would be desired, water users should
know where they stand so that they may provide .for inevitable
drought periods. Industrial and municipal users in particular
might benefit from such information.
If we assume that the agency will make its allocative decisions on a class-by-class rather than on a case-by-case basis,
three basic choices are available. Probably the best approach
is to establish a system of preferences. Water users in a lower
preference category would be required to restrict their use of
water before users in a higher preference group would be forced
to cut back. Perhaps water users who would be most severely
affected by loss of water should be placed in the higher preference categories. For example, irrigators might be placed in a
higher category than municipal water suppliers since the latter
might make use of water storage facilities without serious inconvenience.
Another method would be to prorate the available water
among all users in the affected area. At first blush the notion
of forcing everyone to share the consequences of adversity
seems to be the fairest way to deal with the problem. (It resembles the surface water reasonable use rule or the ground water
correlative rights doctrine.) Nevertheless, this approach might
lead to inefficient results since an across-the-board reduction
for some uses. At the present time in prior appropriation states, savings of that type
would simply increase the return flow to the benefit of downstream appropriations.
Note, Towards an Economic Distributionof Water Rights, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 442, 44546.

2" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.246(1) (West 1975).
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in allowable water use might harm one class of users far more
severely than another. 64
Equitable considerations also support an approach which
allocates water on the basis of temporal priority; that is, those
with the most recent water right would be the first cut off
during a period of water shortage. This, of course, is one of the
most prominent features of the prior appropriation system of
the West. Like prorationing, however, this approach may
achieve fairness at the expense of economic efficiency.
F. Water Resources Planning
Ideally, planning responsibility should be concentrated in
a single agency."6 5 This seldom occurs, however, because of the
large number of federal, state, and local government agencies
involved in water-related activities.
Kentucky, like most states, has planning authority widely
dispersed among various instrumentalities of state and local
government. At the local level numerous public organizations
have a limited planning function in water resource development activities. These include drainage, levee, and reclamation districts,2 66 soil and water conservation districts, 267 wa-

tershed conservancy districts,6 ' flood control districts,6 9 and
water districts. 20 Furthermore, municipal and county planning
units are authorized under the Zoning Enabling Act to do water
resources planning. 27' At the federal level, planning by agencies
such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers27 2 and the Environ264This disadvantage might be offset somewhat if users were permitted, with the

approval of the agency, to purchase additional water from other users during periods
of water shortage. Thus, when across-the-board reductions were made, those most
adversely affected by the cutback would be free to acquire additional water from less
affected water users, while the agency would be able to protect the rights of third
parties. See N.M. CoMP. LAWS §§ 75-40-1 to 7 (1975). See also Trelease, Alternatives
to AppropriationLaw, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 283, 295 (1976).
265See generally Maloney & Ausness, Administering State Water Resources: The
Need for Long-Range Planning, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 209, 213 (1971).
266 KRS chs. 266-69 (1974).
267 KRS ch. 262 (1974).
299 Id.
2°

KRS ch. 104 (1974).

20KRS

ch. 74 (1974).

2' KRS § 100.187(5) (1974).
22 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1970).
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mental Protection Agency2 3 may have a significant impact on
the water resources of this state.
At the state level the Department for Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection has substantial planning responsibilities. 4 However, both the Water Resources Author1
75

ity

and the governor's cabinet26 also possess planning power

in the water resources area. The Department, for example, may
study and review all reports concerning or affecting waterrelated projects within the state which are proposed for construction by federal, state, or local government agencies.2 7 In
addition, the Department may review proposals for any project
which involves the use of state funds in the construction or
maintenance of flood control works or water development purposes.28 Finally, local governmental bodies (and private individuals) must obtain a permit from the Department before
they can construct any dam, embankment, levee, dike, bridge,
fill, or other obstruction across or along any stream.2 79 Thus, it
seems that the Department may prevent local water resource
development agencies from acting contrary to its own policies.
The Water Resources Authority appears to be primarily
concerned with the financing, rather than the planning, of state
and local water resource development projects.2 ° Nevertheless,
the Water Resources Authority is authorized "to coordinate the
programs of all state agencies in the conservation, development
and wise use of public water, ' 281 and "to promote the beneficial
and proper distribution of water throughout the Commonwealth. 2 12 Moreover, the Authority has explicit power to engage in water development planning 3 and maintains some
supervisory authority over the Department. 84 We believe that
the relationship between the Department and the Water Re-

'
"
27

2

33 U.S.C. § 1252, 1258(d), 1289 (Supp. 1975).
KRS § 151.220 (1974).
KRS § 151.360(2)-(3) (1974).
KRS § 147.070(1)(a) (1974).
KRS § 151.220(2) (1974).
KRS § 151.240 (1974).

' KRS § 151.250(1) (1974).

21
U2
2
2"

See KRS § 151.360(1), .370-.450 (1974).
KRS § 151.360(2) (1974).
KRS § 151.360(3) (1974).
KRS § 151.370(11) (1974).
See KRS § 151.200 (1974).
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sources Authority should be clarified. The responsibility for
water resources planning should be concentrated in one agency,
and the present statutory ambiguity should be eliminated.
In addition, as part of the planning process, the regulatory
agency should establish a minimum flow for all surface watercourses.285 No permit should be granted that would cause the
water level in a stream to fall below this point.28 The purpose
of the minimum flow concept, which is used in a number of
states, is to protect activities such as commercial navigation,
recreational boating, fishing, hunting, and swimming. It may
also be used to control water quality and protect the environment.
The regulatory agency should also prohibit or restrict new
water uses on certain streams in order to promote such public
purposes as recreation and the preservation of fish and wildlife
habitats. This idea originated in the West where several states
7
now allow reservation of water by public agencies.2
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABROGATING COMMON LAW
WATER RIGHTS

The short-range proposal discussed earlier virtually abolishes the common law consumptive use doctrines. To the extent that common law water rights may be considered property, this abrogation raises serious constitutional issues. As
noted, a number of eastern states have modified the common
law system of water rights and substituted statutory permit
systems. Despite the fact that so many states regulate water
uses in the East, there have been no direct challenges to the
constitutionality of these statutes. The primary reason for this
remarkable lack of litigation is that, with the exception of Flor2 NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. WATER POLICY 63 (1973).

See generallyFLA. STAT. § 373.042 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455A.1, .22 (West 1971);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1-35, -40 (West 1966); WASH. REv. CODE § 90.22.010. (1976). See
also Hines, A Decade of Experience Under the Iowa Water Permit System, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 499, 537-46 (1967). A similar concept may be used in connection with
ground water.
"I Itmay be desirable to require the regulatory agency to declare a water shortage
when withdrawals by permit users cause the water level to drop below the minimum
flow level.
211 Several western states expressly authorize the appropriation of water for recreational and other public purposes. See, e.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 61.0102 (1967).
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.036(7) (West 1975).
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ida and Iowa, most state regulations are neither comprehensive
nor severely restrictive. Thus, the absence of litigation does not
suggest that water users might not question the constitutionality of statutory permit systems in the future.
A.

Common Law Water Rights as Property

Because of the nature of flowing water, a consumptive-use
right can never be as secure or complete as the ownership of a
book, an automobile, or a house. The corpus of the water in a
flowing stream cannot be privately owned until it is diverted
or reduced to possession in some fashion, and the water right
itself is limited by the reciprocal rights of other users. 8 Ground
water rights at common law are also subject to consumptive
and locational use limitations. Nevertheless, common law
rights regarding surface and ground water should be considered
as property rights within the meaning of due process. Like any
other form of property, however, they are subject to the state's
police power.
B.

The Taking Issue

The police power has been defined as an exercise of the
sovereign right of the state to enact laws for the protection of
the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the
people. While property rights are subject to the police power,
the concept of substantive due process limits the exercise of
this power. 8 9
Substantive due process requires that police power regulations must have a rational relation to the safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the community. Regulations to encourage the conservation and more efficient use of the state's
water resources promote the general welfare and are almost
certainly within the proper scope of the police power. 9 ' Sub-

' Lauer, The RiparianRight as Property,in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 133,
160 (Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law School 1958).
See generally Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 165 (1974); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1971).
2" King, Regulationof Water Rights Under the Police Power, in WATER RESOURCES
AND THE LAW 271, 282 (Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law School
1958); Note, Modificationof the RiparianTheory and Due Process in Missouri, 34 Mo.
L. REv. 562, 571 (1969).
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stantive due process also requires regulation to be reasonable
and not arbitrary or oppressive. An unreasonable exercise of
the police power will be deemed a taking of property without
due process of law.
Over the years, the courts have applied a variety of tests
to determine the constitutional limits of the state police power.
The "diminution-in-value" test, which is probably the most
popular, originated in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.21 He stated:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized,
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied
limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular
facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the
legislature, but it always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional
power.

292

This test compares the magnitude of economic loss imposed on
the regulated party with the harm to the community sought to
93

2
be prevented by the regulation.

While the great majority of courts continue to employ the
diminution-in-value test, some courts have developed other
approaches such as the "harm-to-the-public" test. According
to this rule, a regulation is not a taking if it relieves society of
294
a prospective or actual harm.

Finally, there is the "public rights approach," which com2,

260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).

21

Id. at 413.
See generally F.

23

(1973).
292 See,

BOSSELMAN,

D.

CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE

124-238

e.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342,

20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); Turner v.
County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. App. 1972); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town

of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
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bines an expanded conceptualization of public rights with a
presumption that the needs of the public outweigh any burden
imposed on an individual landowner.2 15 Just v. Marinette
County29 is the leading case. Just involved the constitutionality of an ordinance which prohibited the filling of wetland
areas contiguous to navigable waters without a permit. The
court distinguished between restrictions designed to prevent
harm to the public and those intended to secure a benefit not
presently enjoyed by the public; compensation would not be
required in the first class of cases though it might in the second.
The court concluded that the shoreline regulations merely prevented a harm and, therefore, did not constitute a taking of
property without due process of law. The court also emphasized
that the public right to preserve a2 -7natural area is superior to
an individual's right to develop it.
It is notclear whether the Just court's approach will be
widely accepted or not. However, if the decision means that
developmental value is no longer a property interest within the
protection of substantive due process, then widespread adoption of the Just rationale would mean that only existing uses
could be protected from confiscatory government regulation.
C.

Cases From Western States

Although there are no cases from eastern jurisdictions on
of restricting the exercise of common law
constitutionality
the
8
water rights, there are decisions from the western states.
211

Comment, Regulationof Land Use: From Magna Cartato a Just Formulation,

23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 904, 923-31 (1976).
-1 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
211 An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which
it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others.
The exercise of the police power in zoning must be reasonable and we think
it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public
rights by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.
201 N.W.2d at 768.
"I The Omernick cases from Wisconsin seem to be the only authority on the issue
in the East. In Omernick v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1974), a landowner was
convicted of irrigating his land without a permit, a violation of a Wisconsin statute.
The law required the state to grant an irrigation permit if surplus waters were involved
or if riparians who would otherwise be harmed consented. Since the landowner, a
riparian owner, never applied for a permit, it is not clear whether he would have been
entitled to it as a matter of right under the statute.
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Most of these cases, which involve the validity of replacing
riparian rights with prior appropriation, arose in states where
riparian rights had been recognized before the prior appropriation system was adopted. We will briefly examine decisions
from California, Oregon, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Idaho.
Lux v. Haggin,59 a California decision, was one of the earliest cases to deal with the problem of riparian rights in a prior
appropriation jurisdiction. In the Lux case, the court held that
the riparian doctrine had become part of California law as a
result of the state's adoption of the common law when it was
admitted to the Union and declared that the riparian owner is
entitled to the full natural flow of the watercourse; that this
right attaches to the land and is not created by use nor lost by
nonuse; and that the legislature cannot authorize appropriaThe court rejected the landowner's contention that the statute was a denial of
equal protection because it regulated irrigators but not industrial users. In addition,
the court held that the state could exercise its police power "to protect public rights
and to prevent harm to the public by uncontrolled diversion of water from lakes and.
streams." 218 N.W.2d at 743. Applying the rationale of Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972), the court also concluded that the regulation did not constitute
a taking of property without due process of law since the statute sought to prevent
harm rather than to confer a benefit on the public.
The landowner again challenged a provision of the Wisconsin statute in Omernick
v. Department of Natural Resources, 238 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1976). This time the issue
involved the Department's action in designating the watercourse involved as a trout
stream under the Act's provisions, in effect protecting it from excessive depletion by
irrigators. Although the case was primarily concerned with procedural due process
considerations, the court affirmed its holding in Omernick I that the regulation of
consumptive uses was a valid exercise of the police power. Speaking of the first
Omernick case, the court said:
The necessary implication of this holding [Omernick v. State] is that the
legislature in the exercise of its police power has abrogated the common law
riparian right of irrigation and has substituted the permit procedure under
sec. 30.18, Stats. This has the result of introducing an element of prior use
in the Wisconsin water law which was not there at the common law. The
wisdom of this policy may be debatable, but it is a legislative, not a judicial
determination.
238 N.W.2d at 116.
The Omernick case, if read broadly, will support the notion that common law
water rights are subject to regulation under the state's police power. However, we
should remember that the landowner was not denied a permit since he never applied
for one; a presently-exercised right was not abrogated; and the court relied on the Just
case, rather than the more conventional diminution-in-value approach, to resolve the
taking issue.
"1 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
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tions which interfere with these rights unless the riparian owners are compensated."'
This controversy arose again forty years later in
Herminhaus v. Southern CaliforniaEdison Co.3"' The plaintiffs
in Herminhaus owned a ranch on the San Joaquin River and
sought to enjoin the Southern California Edison Company from
constructing dams on the upper reaches of the river for the
purpose of impounding water for irrigation on nonriparian
lands. The plaintiffs contended that the proposed dam would
prevent the annual spring and summer floods which inundated
and fertilized their land. The defendant's actions were authorized by a permit issued pursuant to the 1913 California Water
Code. Among other things, the Code restricted all water users
to beneficial and reasonable uses, limited the amount of water
which could be used to irrigate an acre of cultivated land, and
provided for the loss of riparian rights for nonuse after a period
of ten years. The court granted the injunction, ruled that the
plaintiffs were entitled to the full flow of the stream, and invalidated the statutory provisions discussed above because they
violated vested riparian rights. 2
Litigation also arose in Oregon after the legislature enacted a comprehensive water allocation law based on the principles of prior appropriation. The Oregon Code purported to
protect vested rights but defined the term to include only the
right to continue to use such quantities of water that were
actually used beneficially prior to the passage of the Code. It
also provided for the loss of vested rights if the riparian owner
failed to use his rights for two years. 33 The Code was upheld
"0 See generally Scurlock, Constitutionalityof Water Rights Regulation, 1 KAN.
L. REV. 125, 139 (1952).
'o 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926).
In 1928, a constitutional amendment was adopted that limited riparian rights
to such water as was reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served. CAL.
CONST. art. XIV, § 3. This provision was upheld in Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22
P.2d 5 (Cal. 1933). Nevertheless, riparian rights are still protected in California. As
the court declared in Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 495 (Cal. 1935), "Any
use by an appropriator which causes substantial damage thereto, taking into consideration all of the present and reasonably prospective recognized uses, is an impairment
of the right for which compensation must be made." See generally United States v.
Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
30 See Eakin, Adjudication Provisions Under the 1909 Water Code-._Survey of
Case Law and Proposals for Legislative Amendment, 50 ORE. L. REv. 664, 669-71
(1971).
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in the case of In re Willow Creek. 34 While admitting that riparian rights could not be arbitrarily or unreasonably impaired
by legislation, the court nevertheless declared that such rights
"are subject to such reasonable regulations as are essential to
the general welfare, peace, and good order of the citizens of the
state."305
The Oregon Water Code, as amended, was again upheld
in In re Hood River0 6 by a four to three decision. At issue was
a provision that preserved as "vested rights" only beneficial
uses in existence at the time of the Code's passage. The court
declared:
No one has any property in the water itself, but a simple
usufruct. It was within the province of the Legislature, by the
act of 1909, to define a vested right of a riparian owner, or to
establish a rule as to when and under what condition and to
what extent a vested right should be deemed to be created in
3 7
a riparian proprietor. 1
In effect, the court concluded that the inchoate riparian right
to unused water had never been a vested interest.
A final challenge to the constitutionality of the Oregon
Water Code was made in California-OregonPower Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 318 The court sustained the constitutionality of the Code and remarked that "[l]ike other property
• . . riparian rights are subject to the police power of the state
and within reasonable limits may be modified by legislation
passed in the interest of the general welfare."3"9 The court then
characterized the right of the riparian owner as a usufruct of
the water and not ownership of the water itself. According to
the court, "[1]egislation limiting the right to its use is in itself
no more objectionable than legislation forbidding the use of
real property for certain purposes. 2'30 Thus, the legislature
could modify common law water rights in the interest of securing a fairer distribution of the resource as well as to prevent
301144 P. 505 (Ore. 1914).
30 Id. at 514.
31 227 P. 1065 (Ore. 1924).
3" Id. at 1087.
73 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1934), aft'd, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
3o 73 F.2d at 562.
311Id. at 567.
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economic and physical waste. 31 1
In 1945, Kansas, like Oregon, revised its water rights laws
to emphasize the prior appropriation element. The Kansas Act
declared that "[s]ubject to vested rights, all waters within the
state may be appropriated for beneficial use. ' 312 However,
it also provided that nothing therein would impair the vested
right of any person except -for nonuse. 31 3 Another section allowed any riparian owner injured as a result of an appropriation under the Act to claim damages against the appropriator
to the extent of any "property taken. '31 Finally, the Act defined "vested right" as "the right . . . to continue the use of
water having actually been applied to any beneficial use...
to the extent of the maximum quantity and rate of diversion
31 5
for the beneficial use made thereof.
State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp,36 was the first in a series of
state and federal court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the 1945 Kansas Act. In Knapp, the state's chief engineer granted a permit pursuant to the Act which allowed an
irrigation district to divert water for use on nonriparian land
in such a manner as to diminish substantially the flow available to downstream riparians. The riparian owners argued that
the Act was an unconstitutional interference with vested property rights. In sustaining the 1945 Act, the court remarked:
We have difficulty in seeing that the owner of land in Kansas
riparian to the Republican River has a vested interest in flood
waters of the river impounded in the Harland dam, eighty
miles or more from his property. If he thinks he has such
rights, and they have been damaged by the impounding of
the water in the dam and its use for irrigation in Nebraska
and Kansas, the statute gives him a right to bring a suit for
such damages. The suggestion that he has such rights as must
be acquired by eminent domain is untenable. The suggestion
that such an owner may be damaged by the use of such water
, The decision was subsequently affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 295 U.S. 142 (1935), although the Court disposed of the case without
deciding the constitutional issues raised before the lower court.
"I KAN. STAT. § 82a-703 (1945).
313Id.
" Id. at § 82a-716.
"'

Id. at § 82a-701(d).

3,, 207 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1949).
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for irrigation upon lands several miles from the river cannot
31
be sustained. 1
Although the analysis of the constitutional issues in the
Knapp decision was superficial, a more detailed examination
is found in the decision of a three-judge federal court in
Baumann v. Smrha,318 a case which involved ground water
rather than surface water. The plaintiff in Baumann owned
land near where the City of Wichita was proposing to construct
a well-field pursuant to a permit issued under the 1945 Act.
The plaintiff, who was not presently using the water, objected
because under the Act any future right to use the ground water
would be subordinated to the superior rights of the municipal
appropriator. Accordingly, he sought a declaratory judgment
that the Act violated the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
Prior to the 1945 Act, Kansas courts had followed the absolute ownership doctrine with respect to ground water.3 91 The
plaintiff argued that the legislature could not abrogate the absolute ownership doctrine and replace it with a prior appropriation system. The court, however, concluded that:
There is no vested right in the decisions of a court and a
change of decisions does not deprive one of the equal protection of the laws or property without due process of the law.
Even though prior decisions of a state court may have
established a rule of property, a departure therefrom in a
subsequent decision does not, without more, constitute a deprivation of property without
due process of law under the
32 0
fourteenth amendment.
Instead, the court maintained, the legislature had the power to
modify or reject the doctrine of riparian rights if it was unsuited
to conditions in the state and to adopt the doctrine of prior
appropriation. In the court's words, "[W]e do not regard a
landowner as having a vested right in underground waters underlying his land which he has not appropriated and applied
32
to beneficial use." '
" Id. at 448.

145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 863 (1956).
319
City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588 (1881).
",
",

145 F. Supp. at 625.
Id. at 624-25.
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The Knapp and Baumann decisions were followed in
Williams v. City of Wichita.32 2 As in the Baumann case, plaintiff Williams was concerned with ground pumping by the City
of Wichita. The city had obtained a permit under the 1945 Act
to appropriate ground water on a tract near the plaintiff's farm.
The landowner brought suit on the theory that the Act was
unconstitutional insofar as it purported to subordinate his
common law ground water rights to the city's appropriative
rights. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and declared
the Kansas Act unconstitutional.
On appeal the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and upheld
the validity of the appropriation statute insofar as the rights
of the plaintiff were concerned:
We find nothing in the Act which in any manner offends
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States or in any way violates the constitution of Kansas.
There is no inhibition in our constitution against legislation
such as this regulatory Act which we
find to be a proper and
13
valid exercise of the police power.3
In reaching its decision, the court first determined that the Act
was a water conservation measure and, as such, was within the
proper scope of the legislature's regulatory power. In order to
promote economic development in the state, the legislature
had determined that allocation of water should be based on
beneficial use and priority without regard to ownership of overlying land and that waste and underdevelopment would occur
if water was reserved in perpetuity for common law owners who
might never have a use for it.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that his
right to ground water was vested as a result of earlier judicial
decisions recognizing the absolute ownership doctrine in Kansas. According to the court: "[T]he legislature may change the
principle of common-law and abrogate decisions made thereunder when in its opinion it is necessary to the public interest. ' '3 4 The court in Williams determined that prospective
uses of ground water were not considered "vested rights"
31 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962). The action was originally brought in a federal court,
but was dismissed. Williams v. City of Wichita, 279 F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1960).
121 374 P.2d at 595.

" Id. at 589.
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as defined by the Act and, therefore, could not be superior to
appropriative rights acquired according to the procedures of
the 1945 Act. The court noted, however, that the landowner
might be able to utilize the Act's damages provision if he
could show an actual injury to his land as a result of the city's
well-drilling and water extraction activities.3 25 Finally, the
court cited the Knapp case with approval and declared that
Knapp's reasoning with respect to unexercised water rights
applied with equal force to both surface and ground water even
though their respective common law allocation rules were different.
The validity of the South Dakota appropriation statute as
it affected the use of percolating ground water came before the
court in Knight v. Grimes.3 21 The plaintiff in the Knight case
had only irrigated a small part of land with ground water prior
to 1962. When he sought to increase his water use he was required to obtain a permit from the State Water Resources
Commission as an appropriator. As such, of course, his right to
the additional water would be subordinate to those of any senior appropriator. The plaintiff instead brought a declaratory
judgment action against the state water engineer and the Commission, contending that under prior case law he had a vested
right to the underlying ground water.
The court upheld the appropriation statute, observing that
since common law water rights were not property in the constitutional sense, water use doctrines could be modified or rejected entirely without constituting a taking of property. In
addition, the court declared that even if water rights were regarded as vested property interests, they were still subject to
regulation under the police power if required by the general
welfare.32
121 The court declared that "the legislature [can] define 'vested rights' of
common-law water uses." Id. at 594. Additionally, the court said, "Nor do we regard

such a landowner as having a vested right. . . to ground water underlying his land."
Id. at 595.
26127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
32 See generally Note, Water Rigftts and the Constitutionalityof the 1955 South
Dakota Water Act, 11 S.D. L. REV. 374 (1966). A controversy over the effect of the
1955 Act on surface water rights arose in Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 176
N.W.2d 239 (S.D. 1970). This was a suit by an irrigation district to enjoin a riparian
landowner from interfering with the rights of the district by diverting for irrigation
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Litigation over ground water rights also occurred in North
Dakota, where a 1955 statute made ground water available for
appropriation. In Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 28 the court declared that presently exercised uses of percolating ground water
were vested in the overlying landowner and held that the plaintiffis vested water rights were superior to those of one who made
a subsequent appropriation under the 1955 law. Nevertheless,
the same court in a later case held that unused rights to ground
water were not protected from appropriation under the 1955
law.329 While presently exercised uses (as of the time of enactment) were vested rights, the court ruled that the state could
exercise its police power and make unused ground water available to appropriators without impairing the property rights of
surface owners.
The taking issue arose in Idaho in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc."' In Baker, a senior appropriator sued to prevent a junior
appropriator from withdrawing ground water in excess of the
annual recharge rate. Idaho's ground water appropriation statute prohibited such "mining" of the resource. In response, the
junior appropriator argued that the court should apply the
common law correlative rights rule, under which each overlying
landowner is entitled to a pro-rata share. The court, however,
rejected this argument even though it conceded that the correlative rights doctrine might have applied at one time in Idaho.
As the court put it, "The doctrine of correlative rights is repugnant to our constitutionally mandated prior appropriation doctrine. ' '33t In effect, the court held that any allocation rights a
landowner formerly possessed under the correlative rights doctrine had been validly abrogated by passage of the appropriation statute.
purposes waters which had been impounded by a dam and released into the river by
the Bureau of Reclamation for the use of the district. On appeal the court stated that
the "decision in the Knight case concerned with underground waters is equally applicable to surface water." Id. at 245. However, since the riparian owner claimed to have
been using water from the river since 1953, two years prior to the 1955 Act, the court
remanded the case for a determination of the extent of the landowner's "vested rights"
under the Act. See also Belle Fouche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105 (S.D.
1973).
120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963).
3'Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
"3

513 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1973).

"3'
Id. at 635.
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On the basis of the cases just discussed, the following principles appear to be well-settled, at least in western jurisdictions. First, conservation of the state's water resources is an
appropriate area of legislative concern.3 3 Second, common law
doctrines are not inflexible, but may be modified within limits,
as warranted by changing economic and social conditions. This
applies to both surface water rules3 3 and ground water rules. 334
Third, in the interests of promoting the efficient use of the
state's water resources, the legislature can extinguish riparian
rights which are not being exercised.33 5 Unused common law
rights to ground water can likewise be terminated without compensation.3 36 Fourth, although common law rights may be terminated, presently exercised water uses are "vested rights"
which cannot be abrogated by the legislature without compensation. 337 This principle is tacitly recognized in other
"California doctrine" states such as Texas and Oklahoma,
where presently exercised uses are expressly preserved by stat33
ute. 8
D.

Constitutionalityof ProposedLegislation in Kentucky

The 'constitutionality of Kentucky's present water allocation statute has never been challenged. This is probably due to
so many water users being exempted from regulation. Of the
"2 California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555 (9th

Cir. 1934); Southwest Eng'r. Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1955); Williams v. City
of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968);
Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
2 In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065 (Ore. 1924); Omernick v. Department of Natural
Resources, 238 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1976).
"I Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 513 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1973); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962);
Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
McCook Irrigation & Water Power Co. v. Crews, 96 N.W. 996 (Neb. 1903); Belle
Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 176 N.W.2d 239 (S.D. 1970).
36 Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157
N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
37 Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926); Lux v.
Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886); Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 64 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1895); Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D.
1963) (ground water); St. Germain Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch Co., 143 N.W. 124
(S.D. 1913); Neilson v. Sponer, 89 P. 155 (Wash. 1907).
T~x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7542a, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 82, § 105.2 (West 1972).
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major categories of water users-domestic, agricultural, municipal, and industrial-only industrial users have any basis for
raising the taking issue. Since the Act exempts domestic and
agricultural users from regulation, those users are not affected. 331 Municipal users, who are subject to the permit requirements, possessed no riparian rights at common law, and
so have not been disadvantaged by the Act's partial abrogation
of common law water rights. Only the remaining class, the
industrial users, have some cause to complain. Industrial users,
including mining and commercial users, who formerly possessed riparian rights now have a statutory water right of dubious value and uncertain duration. However, while this group
of users might argue that the present Kentucky Act constitutes
a taking of private property without due process of law, it is
doubtful that any litigation will occur until the regulatory
agency terminates a permit or refuses to issue one to a former
riparian owner.
What happens when we examine our short-range proposal
in light of the principles derived from western case law? The
first three principles present no serious problem. According to
the first principle, water conservation legislation, such as the
short-range plan, is within the scope of the state's police power.
The second principle upholds the right of the legislature to
modify common law water allocation rules. Thus, the shift
from a system of common law water rights to one of statutory
water rights should not be invalid. The third principle is a
corollary of the second: One way in which common law doctrines can be modified is to terminate unexercised water rights.
Our short-range proposal, with the exception of domestic uses,
would also accomplish this.
The fourth principle provides that presently exercised
water uses are vested rights which may not be terminated without compensation, although they may, of course, be regulated
like other forms of property. This principle is seemingly at
variance with the essential features of the short-range proposal.
Our short-range proposal does not actually terminate existing uses but rather provides for their conversion into permit
"' Possibly downstream unregulated water users could bring a constitutional challenge against the statute if they were harmed by the Department's grant of water use
permits to upstream nonriparian users such as municipalities.
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rights. Arguably, the conditions for a permit under this approach are reasonable. The requirement that common law consumptive uses be "beneficial" has generally been upheld in the
West. 40 In addition, several courts have sustained the validity
of statutes which require the holders of common law rights to
secure a permit from a regulatory agency in order to preserve
their rights against subsequent appropriators.3 4 1 Therefore, we
may assume that this aspect of the proposal is valid.
The real issue is the extent to which an existing user is
injured by surrendering his common law water rights for those
of a permittee. The forced exchange of one type of water right
for another is not necessarily unconstitutional. In effect, that
is what happened when many western states replaced their
common law ground water rules with a prior appropriation
system. Existing ground water uses were quantified and converted into appropriative rights. The common law user in Kentucky, however, unlike his counterpart in the West, may justifiably contend that he has been forced to make a poor
"exchange." While common law water rights were exchanged
for permanent appropriative rights in the West, the owner of
such rights in Kentucky would receive a permit right of limited
duration under our short-range proposal. Arguably, the loss
that he has suffered on the transaction may represent a taking
of property without due process. The security of the statutory
water right is important: The less secure the permit right, the
more likely a court would be to declare the statute unconstitutional. Thus, there may be.a constitutional problem if common
law water users are forced to accept a permit of short duration
or one which may be prematurely terminated by the regulatory
agency without compensation.
We believe that the water right created in our short-term
proposal is secure enough to withstand this sort of constitutional challenge. Since most existing water users would be able
to satisfy the beneficial use requirement, they would obtain a
thirty-year permit. Moreover, we feel that the courts would
341Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
1935); Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 91 N.W.352 (S.D. 1902); Biggs v.
Lee, 147 S.W. 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

95-97 (1974).

3" State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1949); Knight v. Grimes, 127
N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
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refuse to hold that a taking had occurred until an existing
water use was actually curtailed; therefore, the constitutional
issue would not arise until the regulatory agency refused to
renew a permit at the expiration of the thirty-year term. If the
courts adopted this approach, they could then resolve the taking issue on a case-by-case basis.
Once an existing common law water use was actually curtailed by denial or nonrenewal of a water use permit, the validity of the agency's action in that particular case would probably depend on the court's choice of a taking test. In all probability the diminution-in-value test discussed earlier would be
used since Kentucky courts have employed a similar rationale
on many occasions in the past."2 Applying this formula, a court
would have to determine the extent of actual harm that a landowner suffers when common law water rights are restricted or
completely abrogated. Since water rights in the East are not
usually transferable, the value of a water right must be measured primarily in relation to a particular tract of land. Thus,
if a water right was completely destroyed, we would look at the
diminution in value not of the water right itself, but of the land
to which it is appurtenant. For example, in an area where
irrigation is necessary, loss of a common law water right might
virtually destroy the value of a farm. If the farm was not suitable for some other productive use, the diminution in value as
a result of the regulation would probably be sufficient to constitute a taking. In cases where the regulatory agency forced a
permit holder to obtain his water from a more distant source
of supply, the courts might also treat the capitalized cost of
obtaining water from this new source as a diminution in value.
No doubt in some instances this sum would be large enough to
require compensation.
At present the public rights test of Just v. Marinette
County343 is not used in Kentucky. Even under the Just rationale, however, presently exercised water rights would probably
be entitled to constitutional protection. However, this Wisconsin case possibly could be used to sustain a regulatory agency's
312 E.g., Hobbs v. Markey, 398 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1966); Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d
881 (Ky. 1964); City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 230 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1950); Schloemer
v. City of Louisville, 182 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1944).
3,3 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
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decision to deny new consumptive use permits in order to prevent expansion of existing uses or initiation of new ones in some
areas to protect minimum stream flows or to promote recreational or environmental interests.
In conclusion, the requirements of substantive due process
will impose some constraints on the design of a water allocation
system. The risk of constitutional infirmity becomes greater as
the regulatory agency is given more power to transfer water
rights from one group of water users to another without compensation in order to achieve a more efficient allocation pattern. However, the more modest approach suggested by the
short-range proposal should not encounter any serious consti3 44
tutional difficulties.
V.

LONG-RANGE PROPOSALS: FOUR ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION
SYSTEMS

Although Kentucky's water resources are adequate at the
present time, greater reliance on irrigation in agricultural operations, increased urban and industrial growth, and the evolution of new technologies (such as coal conversion) will all contribute to a rising demand for water in the years ahead. Eventually, demand for water will exceed the available supply 345 and
it will be necessary to develop a mechanism for allocating the
state's limited water resources among the various competing
users and uses. This section will consider four alternatives for
accomplishing this objective. Each involves some form of allocation by an administrative agency, but most also permit market forces to operate.
31 Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution states, "The general assembly shall
have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or
for injuries to person or property." In addition, § 14 declares that "all courts shall be
open and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation,

shall have remedy by due course of law .

. . ."

Although these provisions limit the

power of the legislature to abolish common law tort actions, Ludwig v. Johnson, 49
S.W. 2d 347 (Ky. 1932) (automobile guest statute), it is doubtful that they would apply
where the underlying property right is abolished or modified, as in the case of common
law water rights. The validity of such legislative action should instead be determined
by reference to substantive due process requirements.
3," Within limits the supply of water within a region can be increased by desalting,
precipitation augmentation, better land management practices, and the importation
of water from other areas. See generally NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES
FOR THE FruTuR 335-63 (1973).
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Short-Term Permits

A.

The issuance of short-term water use permits is a common
aspect of water regulation policy in the eastern states. Iowa, for
example, limits permits to a ten-year term, 46 while the Florida
Water Resources Act sets a maximum period of twenty years. 4
This approach reflects a philosophy that water is a public resource which should not be entirely left to private control.3 8 In
addition, legislation of this sort implicitly assumes that an
administrative agency can allocate water more efficiently than
market forces. 49
This alternative also allows the state water regulatory
agency to deal with reallocation problems in a flexible manner.
In particular, the agency would be able to correct prior mistakes, utilize new data in the decision making process, and
respond to changing needs and values. Moreover, the use of
short-term permits, when coordinated with state land use controls, would facilitate long-range planning and would allow the
government to direct growth along rational lines. 50
On the other hand, economists and others have argued
that this approach creates a climate of uncertainty regarding
water resources and discourages capital investment. The use of
short-term permits, according to one commentator, merely
substitutes the uncertainties of administrative decision making
for the uncertainties of common law rules." ' Since short-term
permits seldom last long enough to allow for amortization, entrepreneurs must gamble on whether their permits will be renewed. If the permit is renewed at the expiration date, all is
well; but if the agency rejects the renewal application, the
water user may lose a part of his original investment. The risk
of nonrenewal may create similar problems during the term of
'"

IOWA CODE ANN.

311 FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 455A.20 (West Supp. 1977).

§ 373.236 (West 1974). See also

(1958); MODEL WATER CODE § 2.06 (1972).
311See J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN &
TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY 246-47 (1960).

MODEL WATER UsE ACT

J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY-ECONOMICS,

31' NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE
'

§ 406

286-87 (1973).

Moses, Water as a Tool for RecreationalLand Use Planning,24 SYRACUSE L.

REv. 1047 (1973); White, Water as a Tool in Land Use Control, Legal Considerations:
An Exploratory Essay, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 671 (1974).
35 Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the Goddam

Bureaucrat,14 NAT.

RESOURCES

J. 207, 216 (1974).
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a permit. For example, suppose an irrigation system of pumps
and sprinklers, which initially cost forty thousand dollars hopelessly breaks down in the fifteenth year of a twenty-year per35 2
mit. Will it be replaced?
Opponents of the short-term permit approach have expressed doubts that an administrative agency can allocate
water as efficiently as the market. They -are also concerned with
arbitrary behavior or corruption on the part of the regulatory
agency 3 3 and these fears are not entirely illusory.3 4 Finally,
there is a question of fairness. Quite apart from considerations
of efficiency, the propriety of destroying the value of one person's property in order to benefit another is open to serious
question. Perhaps the best solution is to require the new user
to compensate the original user when the latter's permit is not
renewed.
B.

Variable-Term Permits

Some commentators argue that a water right should last
for the duration of the user's operation or enterprise.3 55 In the
case of irrigation or municipal water supply, a water permit
based on this principle might be granted in perpetuity, although one for a mining operation might last only until the
mineral involved is completely extracted. Unfortunately, although a water rights system based on long-term permits provides maximum security for water users, it may not be efficient
in the long run unless it also contains a mechanism for reallocation.
One proposal, recommended for eastern states by the National Water Commission, would achieve reallocation through
involuntary transfers. 56 Under this approach permits would be
352 This

example is taken from F. TRELEASE,
n.3 (2d ed. 1974).

WATER LAW: RESOURCE USE AND ENVI-

RONMENTAL PROTECTION 434

313Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the Goddam

Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207, 211-17 (1974).
3 The rather poor record of zoning agencies in this respect stands as a warning
to those who would put their faith in the desirability of resource allocation by governmental bodies. See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); Dukeminier &
Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J.
273 (1962).
Trelease, Alternatives to Appropriation Law, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 283,
286 (1976).
"I NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 286-87 (1973).
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granted for a period long enough for the water user to amortize
his investment. Depending on the nature of the enterprise, per35
mits might be issued for terms of up to fifty or sixty years.
Moreover, the regulatory agency would be required to renew
the permit indefinitely unless it determined that water was
needed for a higher public purpose such as municipal water
supply, recreation or environmental protection. 58 This would
protect most productive uses even after full amortization of the
to recapture
original investment but would still allow the state
3 59
uses.
public
legitimate
for
cost
without
water
Although reallocation can occur from private to public
uses, an inefficient pattern of water use may still result unless
transfers among private users are also allowed. Unfortunately,
there are problems with permitting voluntary transfers under
a variable-term permit scheme. For example, suppose a farmer
obtains a forty-year permit and sells it to an industrial user
thirty years later. Let us assume that the industrial user would
require sixty years to amortize his investment. Presumably, the
water right obtained from the farmer would be good for another
ten years, the remainder of the original permit term. When it
comes up for renewal, assuming that the water is not required
for a higher public use, what duration period should be used
for the new permit? Should it be forty years, the length of the
original term, or fifty years, the remaining period needed to
amortize the investment of the new user?
If the goal of protecting initial investment is to be met, the
fifty-year period seems appropriate. However, it should be
noted that the new user would sustain an uncompensated loss
if the water regulatory agency refused to renew the original
permit when it expired. In our example, the farmer's permit
2" According to one estimate, the normal period for depreciation of a manufacturing plant is 40 years and some plants have useful lives of 60 years or more. Trelease,
The Model Water Code, the Wise Administratorand the Goddam Bureaucrat, 14 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 207, 219 (1974).
-' This avoids a situation where the permit holder, who obtained his water right
without cost, gains a windfall profit when the state is forced to reacquire the water for
a higher public purpose.
21 Presumably no compensation would be required if a permit is not renewed
when it expires if the water user's investment has been amortized. A similar principle
applies in zoning law when nonconforming uses are terminated after the expiration of
an amortization period. It should be pointed out, however, that the water user incurs
a loss even though there is no taking in the constitutional sense.
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had ten years to run when purchased by the industrial user. If
this permit were not renewed, the new user would lose more
than eighty percent of his investment."'o A possible solution to
this problem would be to issue the new user another permit at
the time he buys out the earlier user. In our example, when the
farmer and the industrial user reached an agreement over the
sale of the farmer's water right, they would request the water
regulatory agency to issue a new permit based on an amortization period appropriate to the new user's operation. If the
agency determined that the water was needed for a higher public use, it would deny the request. The projected transfer would
not take place, but the farmer would still retain his water right
for the remainder of the permit's term, ten years in our case.
If the agency agreed to the request, assuming no third parties
were adversely affected by the proposed transfer, it would issue
a new permit to the industrial user which in our example would
be valid for sixty years. Like the original permit, this water
right would be renewable indefinitely, subject to the state's
right to reallocate the water for higher public uses at each
31
renewal period.
C.

Permits of PerpetualDuration

The third alternative places more emphasis on the market
as a reallocation mechanism. Under this approach, the water
regulatory agency would issue permits of a perpetual nature on
a "first come, first served" basis as long as water was available.
These water rights would be transferable, subject to agency
approval in order to protect public rights and third-party interests.
Water rights of perpetual duration are, of course, a promi390In our example, only 10 years of a 60-year amortization would have elapsed
before the new user's water right was terminated by the agency's refusal to renew the
permit. Thus, 5/6 of the original investment (plus the cost of acquiring the water right
from the farmer) would be unamortized.
3" In its proposal, the National Water Commission suggests that variable-term
permits be subject to renewal "for a similar period" unless the agency reallocates the
water to a higher public purpose. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR
THE FUTURE 286-87 (1973). This would mean renewal periods of up to 60 years or more
for some users. If the variable-term permit approach is adopted, a uniform renewal
period of 40 or 50 years is recommended for operations like agriculture and industrial
uses which have a potentially long useful life.

1977]

WATER USE PERMITS

nent feature of prior appropriation. As mentioned earlier, the
prior appropriation system has been proposed in a number of
eastern states in the past thirty years. Undoubtedly, a water
right of perpetual duration is secure enough to encourage capital investment, a necessary requirement for optimum use.
Reallocation will occur as conditions warrant by voluntary
transfers among water users. In this fashion, market forces
should eventually achieve the most efficient allocation pattern
possible. Moreover, the minimum flow and reservation concepts discussed earlier in our short-range proposal could be
utilized in order to protect environmental, recreational, and
aesthetic interests.
Unfortunately, like the other long-range alternatives, this
approach also has its disadvantages. Perhaps the most serious
problem is inflexibility. At least in the West there is evidence
that prior appropriation tends to force water uses into a rigid
pattern based on the original appropriations. 6 2 This may be
due to the fact that changes in use or location, while theoretically possible, are often difficult to make in practice. 3 In the
West transfers are particularly hard to arrange when they involve a change from a nonconsumptive to a consainptive use,
thereby diminishing the rate of return flow to the stream and
impairing the rights of downstream users. 6'
However, if an efficient water use pattern cannot be
achieved by means of voluntary transfers alone, the state could
also allow involuntary transfers through the use of a preference
system. This device, which is found in some prior appropriation
jurisdictions, utilizes a system of preference categories which
allows a water user in a one preference category to condemn the
water right of a user in a lower preference category. 65 For exam2' Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REv. 1, 17 (1970); Maloney,

Florida'sNew Water Resources Law, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 119, 127 (1957).
3" Seastone & Hartman, Alternative Institutions for Water Transfers: The Experience in Colorado and New Mexico, 39 LAND ECON. 31 (1963); Trelease, Policies for
Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulations, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 33 (1965); Yeutter, A Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse
Law, 44 NES. L. REV. 11, 41 (1965).
21 Davis, Australianand American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. Rav. 647, 694 (1968).
35 Fisher, Western Experience and EasternAppropriationProposals, in THE LAW
OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES

75, 123-27 (D. Haber & S. Bergen

eds. 1958); Thomas, Appropriationsof Water for a PreferredPurpose, 22 ROCKY MTN.
L. Rav. 422 (1950).
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pie, industrial uses were placed in a higher category than agricultural uses, and industrial users could acquire a farmer's
water right in a condemnation action. Of course, the industrial
user would have to pay the farmer the fair market value of his
water right and also indemnify third parties for any losses they
would sustain as a result of the proposed change in use. The
requirement for compensation not only satisfies due process
requirements but also insures that the transfer will take place
only when the new user can make a more productive use of the
water than the original user.3 6
D.

The "Pseudo-Market"Approach

In this country, scarce resources are usually allocated on
the basis of prices in a competitive market," ' particularly when
economic efficiency is an important consideration. 6 ' Although
water has economic value as a factor of production, water use
is not always strongly influenced by market forces. Consequently, some economists have advocated the use of a pseudomarket administered by the state.3 9 This device would enable
water users to recognize and respond to the actual cost of their
water use, including both the cost of delivering the water and
"' This example was chosen because the average value product of consumptive
water use is usually higher in industry than in agriculture. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts
Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights, 32 LAND ECON. 295, 301
(1956).
"I Prices have an important function in the market process. Where total resources
are limited, the output of one commodity can increase only if resources are diverted
to it from the production of something else. A misallocation of resources occurs when
the benefits from the increase of one commodity do not exceed the cost of foregone
alternative products and services. Prices reflect these costs to consumers and provide
them with an incentive to increase consumption when the real benefits exceed the real
costs.
3" Society seeks to achieve an optimal or efficient allocation of resources on the
theory that, given a particular distribution of wealth, this reflects a point at which
human welfare is maximized. An optimal allocation is achieved when it is impossible
by rearranging to benefit anyone without injuring someone else. Note, Economic Implications for Arizona's Ground Water Law, 1972 LAw & Soc. ORDER 626, 634. For a
discussion of the concept of efficiency and its role in resource allocation theory, see L.
JAMES & R. LEE, ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 43-118 (1971); McKean,
Products Liability: Trends and Implications,38 U. CI. L. REv. 3, 24-42 (1970).
"' Wollman, Economic Factorsin the Study of Water Use, in THE LAW OF WATER
ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES

565 (D. Haber & S. Bergen eds. 1958);

Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law: Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market
Prices, 57 VA. L. REv. 345 (1971).
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the "opportunity cost" or values foregone by diverting the
310
water from other potential uses.
Under one such proposal the state would expropriate all
existing water rights and allow an administrative agency to
allocate the available water among competing buyers within a
particular hydrologic area at demand-generated prices.37 ' The
agency would accomplish this function by the sale of "water
certificates" which would allow the holder to withdraw a specific amount of water from the area until the certificate's expiration period. These certificates would be sold or leased among
users subject to the agency's supervision.
The sale of water rights by the state, as opposed to giving
them away without cost, not only promotes an efficient initial
allocation pattern, but it also prevents water users from obtaining "windfall" profits when they transfer their water rights. In
addition, the agency could use the revenue generated from such
sales in order to finance water conservation and development
progress.
At the end of a fixed period the certificates would revert
to the agency and would be offered for sale again. The expiration dates of the initial certificates would be staggered so that
some water would be available each year for sale by the agency.
The agency could secure water for public purposes in a given
year by not re-issuing some of the certificates which had expired; when necessary, it could also purchase additional certificates from existing users at market prices.
Of course, there are many problems that must be overcome
if the pseudo-market is to allocate the state's water resources
efficiently. First of all, the agency must determine how much
3 2
water is available in a particular area for allocation purposes.
Undesirable shortages will occur if the agency sells too many
water certificates. The agency must also determine the optimum duration period for its water certificates. Finally, it may
have to take measures to prevent some users from monopoliz31*Campbell, et al., Water Management in Ontario-An Economic Evaluationof
Public Policy, 12 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 475, 500 (1974).
,11Kiker & Lynne, Water Allocation Under Administrative Regulation: Some
Economic Considerations,S.J. AGR. EcoN. 57 (Dec. 1976).
372 The agency should set aside sufficient water to maintain minimum stream
flows and protect public interests when it calculates the amount of water that is
available for sale.
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ing the available water supply or manipulating the price of
37 3
certificates .
The pseudo-market approach is an intriguing one, particularly when viewed as a long-term solution to the problem of
efficient water allocation. However, it remains to be seen
whether such a complex system could actually operate effectively in practice.
CONCLUSION

Our examination has revealed a number of weaknesses in
Kentucky's water allocation law. These defects are not likely
to be very troublesome as long as water supplies are sufficient
to meet demand, but they will undoubtedly cause substantial
problems in the future as water becomes scarce in some areas
of the state.
The common law rules, particularly with respect to surface
water, are uncertain and insecure, characteristics which may
discourage investment in water-dependent industries. Placeof-use restrictions also inhibit optimum use of the resource.
Kentucky's present water regulatory law, which was enacted to remedy some of the deficiencies of the common law
rules, also contains serious flaws. The existence of large numbers of exempt users undermines the state's water regulatory
policy. Water rights under the permit system are insecure and
there is no mechanism for reallocation by voluntary transfers
among water users. In addition, the provisions of the Act relating to water shortages are unnecessarily vague.
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 151 should be replaced by a better water allocation law. The short-range proposal suggested in Part III might serve as a model. It would
provide the water regulatory agency with sufficient authority
to formulate and implement a coherent water resources policy
for the state while at the same time avoiding unnecessary interference with the affairs of private water users. Moreover, we
believe that this proposal can abolish common law water rights
without violating the requirements of substantive due process.
'7' The integrity of the pseudo-market system would be compromised if the promised water were not available. One commentator suggests prorationing during periods
of shortage. Kiker & Lynne, Water Allocation UnderAdministrative Regulation:Some
Economic Considerations,S.J. AGR. ECON. 57, 62 (Dec. 1976).
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Eventually, as the demand for water increases, the state
will have to play a larger role in the allocation process. The four
alternatives discussed in Part V indicate the wide range of
options available. It is hoped that when the time comes the
state will be able to choose the alternative that best meets its
needs and objectives.

